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JUDICIAL BALANCING IN TIMES OF STRESS:
COMPARING THE AMERICAN, BRITISH, AND
ISRAELI APPROACHES TO THE
WAR ON TERROR
Michel Rosenfeld*
INTRODUCTION
In 2004, the highest court in three different countries, the United
States, Israel, and the United Kingdom, handed down major decisions in
cases regarding the war on terror.1 All these cases involved conflicts
between liberty and security in the context of combating terrorism, and
in all three countries the decisions were the product of judicial
balancing.2 The factual settings of the cases varied significantly from
one country to the next. Two of the three American cases arose out of
the war in Afghanistan undertaken to uproot Al Qaeda and the Taliban
* Justice Sydney L. Robins Professor of Human Rights, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of
Law. I wish to thank the participants at the Rockefeller Foundation Bellagio Center conference
entitled “Terrorism, Globalism and the Rule of Law,” held July 18-22, 2005, for their invaluable
comments and suggestions on an earlier draft of this Article. I also thank Professor Bernhard
Schlink for his incisive reading and helpful advice. No one, but me, is responsible for any
remaining errors. Finally, I wish to thank the Floersheimer Center for Constitutional Democracy
at Cardozo for funding a faculty summer research grant, which enabled me to complete this
Article.
1 The U.S. cases are Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507
(2004); and Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004). The Israeli cases are HCJ 2056/04 Beit
Sourik Village Council v. The Government of Israel, [2004], available at
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/04/560/020/a28/04020560.a28.pdf [hereinafter Beit Sourik]
and HCJ 4764/04 Physicians for Human Rights v. Commander of the IDF Forces in the Gaza
Strip, [2004], available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/04/640/047/a03/04047640.a03.htm
[hereinafter Physicians for Human Rights]. The United Kingdom case is A(FC) v. Secretary of
State for the Home Department, [2004] UKHL 56, [2005] 2 A.C. 68 (H.L.) (appeal taken from
Eng.) (U.K.).
2 Consistent with the terminology used by many courts outside the United States, see, for
example, The Queen v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (Can.); Pharmacy Case,
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] June 11, 1958, 7
Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 379 (F.R.G.) (Germany); Hauer v.
Land Rheinland-Pfalz, 1979 E.C.R. 3727, (E.C.J.), the Israeli Supreme Court referred to the test it
used in its two above mentioned decisions as a “proportionality test.” For their part, the British
Law Lords used both a “proportionality” test and “balancing.” As will be discussed below, see
discussion infra Part I.C, the American and British “balancing” approach and the Israeli and
British “proportionality” analysis are not completely equivalent, but they largely overlap.
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after the terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11,
2001. These two cases concerned individuals captured in Afghanistan
who were being held indefinitely without charges either in the United
States or in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, on an American military base
located there.3 The third American case concerned an American citizen
arrested and held indefinitely on U.S. soil upon being suspected of
involvement in an Al Qaeda terrorist plot.4 Of the two Israeli cases, one
arose in connection with the building of a barrier on the West Bank by
the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to protect Israeli citizens from
Palestinian suicide bombers,5 while the other involved the conduct by
the IDF of military operations in Gaza “directed against the terrorist
infrastructure” in that area.6 Finally, the British case was prompted by
indefinite detention without charges of non-citizens suspected of having
ties to terrorism who could not be deported to their countries of origin
without violation of humanitarian laws because of the likelihood that
they would be tortured upon arrival there.7
Although all three countries were actively engaged in the war on
terror at the times that their respective courts handed down the decisions
mentioned above, each of the countries was confronting a markedly
different situation from the others. The United States had suffered a
single-day coordinated terrorist attack that claimed around 3,000 lives
on its territory on September 11, 2001. It engaged thereafter in two
foreign wars in far distant countries, Afghanistan and Iraq, which posed
no apparent serious threats to America’s domestic security or territorial
integrity. In contrast, in Israel, between 2000 and 2004, there were 780
terrorist attacks on Israeli soil collectively claiming 900 lives8—
proportionately the equivalent of 45,000 lives in the United States,
given Israel’s population of 6 million versus the U.S.’s population of
300 million.9 In contrast, the United Kingdom had not suffered a
terrorist attack on its territory from September 2001 until the Law Lords
issued their decision in December 2004. Since then, however, Britishborn citizens conducted terrorist attacks on London subways and buses

3 See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 510 (concerning U.S. citizen held in U.S. prison); Rasul, 542 U.S.
at 470 (concerning foreign detainees held in Guantanamo).
4 See Padilla, 542 U.S. at 430.
5 See Beit Sourik, supra note 1, paras. 1-2.
6 Physicians for Human Rights, supra note 1, para. 1.
7 See A(FC) v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t [2004] UKHL 56, [2005] 2 A.C. 68, 92-93
(H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.).
8 See Beit Sourik, supra note 1, para. 1.
9 Israel’s
population is approximately 6 million.
See Israel Population,
http://www.nationbynation.com/Israel/population.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2006). The United
States’s population is almost 300 million.
See U.S. and World Population Clock,
http://www.census.gov/main/www/popclock.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2006).
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in July 2005.10 Approximately fifty United Kingdom citizens were
killed in the September 11th attack on the World Trade Center in New
York and the United Kingdom had feared ever since becoming a target
of international terrorism, fears partially realized by the July 2005
London attacks. This fear has been fueled by the prominent role played
by the United Kingdom in the U.S.-led coalition engaged in military
operations in Iraq and by the presence within the United Kingdom of
sizable numbers of citizens and aliens sympathetic to Al Qaeda’s cause.
Notwithstanding these important differences among the three
countries, they have all conducted the war on terror under conditions of
stress rather than under conditions of crisis or emergency. As will be
discussed in Part I below, conditions of stress fall somewhere between
ordinary conditions and conditions of crisis. It is clear that in the
context of the fear of terrorism and of the battle against it none of the
three countries is living in ordinary times. On the other hand, none of
the three countries has been thrown into a state of crisis by its
confrontation with terror. For the United States, for example, the
current threat posed by terror is not comparable to the Cuban missile
crisis, when the Soviet Union and the United States were dangerously
flirting with mutual nuclear annihilation. Similarly, the United
Kingdom’s confrontation with terror is not comparable to the
experience of fighting virtually alone against the Nazis during part of
World War II, where Great Britain faced a real risk of military defeat
and subsequent subjugation of the British people to brutal Nazi
occupation. Finally, Palestinian suicide bombings in the past four years
do not put Israel’s survival in question as did the 1948 war of
independence or the 1967 or 1973 wars fought against several
neighboring countries.
In ordinary times, judicial balancing or proportionality analysis is
common and widespread in dealing with conflicts between liberty and
security, and more generally, between individual rights and important
societal goals.11 In times of crisis, however, balancing becomes
problematic and highly contested. In some countries the constitution
provides for invocation of a state of emergency that allows for
suspension or derogation of fundamental rights.12 Even in the United
States, where the Constitution does not provide for emergency powers,
10 On July 7, 2005, four British men of Pakistani origin set off three bombs on London
subway trains and one bomb on a London double-decker bus, killing fifty-two and injuring seven
hundred. See Alan Cowell & Don van Natta, Jr., 4 From Britain Carried Out Terror Blasts,
Police Say, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2005, at A1. Two weeks later, on July 21, 2005, bombs on three
more subways and one more double-decker bus failed to detonate. See Alan Cowell, Bombs Set
at 4 London Sites, but Fail to Explode, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2005, at A1.
11 See cases cited supra note 2.
12 See cases cited supra note 2; see, e.g., 1958 French Constitution, art. 16.
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the right of habeas corpus can be suspended in a crisis13 and Presidents
have de facto increased their powers in times of war or emergency.14
Moreover, of the three different positions on how to deal with conflicts
between liberty and security in times of crisis that have dominated the
debate in the United States,15 two appear to do away altogether with
judicial balancing.
The three positions are: (1) “executive
unilateralism,” which favors allowing complete discretion to the
executive branch without any oversight from any other institution,16 (2)
“civil libertarian maximalism,” which requires the same judicial
balancing in times of crisis as in ordinary times,17 and (3) a “processbased institutional approach” requiring coordination between Congress
and the President.18 Positions (1) and (3) involve no judicial balancing,
and (1) may require no balancing at all,19 whereas (3) relies on some
kind of non-judicial balancing, namely on “checks and balances”
between the legislative branch and the executive branch.20
Position (2) is not persuasive in the context of a crisis to the extent
that it seems counterintuitive that liberties need be just as extensively
protected at times when the nation’s survival is in peril as in ordinary
times. What about during times of stress? Does this depend on whether
the differences between ordinary times and times of crisis are viewed
primarily in quantitative rather than qualitative terms—in other words,
in terms of ascribing different weights to the various interests that must
be weighed against one another rather than in terms of categorical
distinctions calling for altogether different approaches?
The decisions in all three countries were the product of judicial
balancing, but some of them also prompted concurring and dissenting

13 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (permitting suspension of habeas corpus in cases of
invasion or insurrection).
14 See CLINTON ROSSITER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF, 11-132
(expanded ed. 1976) (1951).
15 For a thoughtful account of the various approaches developed during the course of
American history, see Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pilides, Emergency Contexts Without
Emergency Powers: The United States’ Constitutional Approach to Rights During Wartime, 2
INT’L. J. CONST. L. 296 (2004).
16 Id. at 297.
17 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 531-33 (2004); see also Cass Sunstein, Minimalism
at War, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 47, 49 (distinguishing between “a natural security maximalism” and
“liberty maximalism,” which roughly correspond respectively to positions (1) and (2) above).
18 See Issacharoff & Pilides, supra note 15, at 297.
19 Whether or not position (1) requires any balancing depends on whether one regards the
Executive Power in terms of its duty to uphold constitutional rights while pursuing security, see
infra Part II, pp. 2109-10, or exclusively as devoted to safeguarding security.
20 Legislative power can provide a “check and balance” on executive power to the extent that
the two have different institutional interests or political objectives. Accordingly, whereas judicial
balancing is supposed to rely on some notion of proportionality, see infra Part II, a “balance”
between legislative and executive power need not relate in any way to proportionality.
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opinions relying on categorical approaches.21 Furthermore, some of the
judges involved regarded the relevant controversies as arising under
conditions of crisis, others regarded them as arising under conditions of
stress, and yet others regarded them as arising under close to ordinary
conditions.22
To compound these difficulties, collectively the six decisions make
use of three different legal paradigms to deal with the various conflicts
between liberty and security presented for adjudication. These
paradigms are: (1) the “law of war paradigm,” (2) the “criminal law
paradigm,” and (3) the “police power law paradigm.”23
No
straightforward correlation ties the three conditions described above to
these three legal paradigms. Nevertheless, the law of war paradigm
seems most compatible with conditions of crisis, whereas the other two
paradigms seem best suited for ordinary times.
The thesis defended in this Article is that none of the six decisions
deals with the conflict between liberty and security in the context of the
war on terror in the best possible way. It is necessary to treat the war on
terror, absent extraordinary circumstances, as occurring under
conditions of stress. Moreover, these conditions ought to be correlated,
all other things being equal, to a new legal paradigm: the “war-on-terror
law paradigm.” Under this thesis, judicial balancing has an important
role to play in the optimal resolution of war on terror cases. That role is
not exclusive but circumscribed by shared institutional responsibility
between legislative, executive and judicial power. Finally, reliance on
conditions of stress and on the war-on-terror law paradigm makes for an
appropriately calibrated judicial balancing. In contrast, as we shall see,
the American cases seem to place too much weight on security or too
little on liberty;24 the Israeli cases, conversely, too little weight on
security;25 and the British case, falling somewhere between the
American and the Israeli, seems to reach the right result, but not
necessarily because of any principled use of judicial balancing.26
To elaborate the above thesis, this Article proceeds as follows.
Part I sets the theoretical framework by focusing on four issues: the
distinctions between conditions of stress, ordinary conditions, and
conditions of crisis; the distinctions between the three existing
paradigms of law that figure in the six decisions under consideration;
the relationship between proportionality and judicial balancing; and the
prevalent background conditions for each of the six cases, in order to set
21
22
23
24
25
26

See infra pp. 2112-22.
See infra text accompanying notes 235-241.
See infra Part I.B.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
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the parameters of relevant comparison. Part II examines the American
cases, Part III the Israeli cases, and Part IV the British case. Part V
compares American balancing, Israeli proportionality analysis, and their
British counterparts. Finally, Part VI explores the optimal role for
judicial balancing consistent with the thesis that links times of stress and
the war-on-terror law paradigm.
I. THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
How to handle the conflict between liberty and security in the war
on terror and how to do it through judicial balancing depend on the
characterization of the prevailing conditions, and on whether terrorists
are conceived as criminals who must be prosecuted or as enemy
warriors who must be killed or captured and detained until the end of
hostilities. As will be demonstrated below,27 the six decisions are not
consistent in their dealings with these issues. They are often at odds
with one another and even, at times, seemingly internally
contradictory.28
The theoretical framework outlined below is meant to provide the
critical tools necessary for cogent analysis of the existing jurisprudence
and for elaboration of the thesis presented in this Article.
A.

Times of Stress vs. Ordinary Times and Times of Crisis

Times of stress are neither ordinary times nor times of crisis. In
the context of a crisis, be it military, economic, social, or natural, the
head of government may be entitled to proclaim exceptional powers and
to suspend constitutional rights, including political rights. In an acute
crisis, the polity is singularly focused on survival, and all other political
concerns and objectives recede into the background.29 In contrast, in
ordinary times, the polity can readily absorb the full impact of the give
and take of everyday politics, and constitutional rights ought to be
protected to their fullest possible extent.

27 See, e.g., Hamdi as discussed infra Part II, pp. 2113-22 (Eight justices rejected the Bush
Administration’s position, but some did so based on the law of war paradigm, while others relied
on the criminal law paradigm.).
28 See infra Parts II, III.
29 The grant and duration of exceptional emergency powers are problematic not in relation to
their proper use as means to combat threats to the life of the polity, but in relation to the potential
for abuse in the invocation or prolongation of such powers. See Bruce Ackerman, The
Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029, 1040 (2004).
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Times of stress differ from those of crisis primarily in terms of the
severity, intensity, and duration of the respective threats involved. The
line between the two may be difficult to draw, but a less severe, less
intense, and more durable threat is likely to give rise to times of stress
whereas a severe, intense, concentrated threat, of relatively shorter
duration, is likely to provoke a crisis. For example, a foreign military
invasion or a widespread domestic insurrection is likely to provoke a
crisis. On the other hand, the aftermath of the terrorist attacks against
New York City on September 11th, 2001—which involved threats,
perceived threats, launching a “war on terror” fought mainly in far away
countries, arrest and detention of potential terrorists, but no further
terrorist attack on the United States as of the time of this writing—has
produced times of stress rather than times of crisis.30
The distinction between ordinary times, times of crisis, and times
of stress can be further elaborated consistent with a pluralist conception
of the polity where politics looms as the ongoing confrontation between
self and other. In a pluralist polity, different groups—ethnic, religious,
or ideological—and different interests compete for power and scarce
political goods. Such competition, moreover, can be characterized as
struggles between self and other. In ordinary times, conflicts between
self and other do not threaten the unity of the polity and find resolution,
or at least confinement, within the existing constitutional, institutional,
and political framework. Thus, in spite of the fact that a number of
struggles relating to individual or group identity and to the
apportionment of benefits and burdens throughout the polity split the
citizenry into a multiplicity of selves pitted against numerous others, the
common self that binds all citizens to the unity of the polity remains
glued together and shows no danger of unraveling. In ordinary times,
neither self nor other may be fully satisfied with their fate and may be
likely to struggle continuously to ameliorate their respective positions.
Neither of them, however, is likely to become so dissatisfied with his or
her status or with the existing institutional framework for processing
conflicts as to want to withdraw from the polity.
Times of crisis, in contrast, occur when the common identity or the
very life of the polity are in imminent peril. The cause of the peril may
be external, as in the case of a foreign war, or internal, as in the case of
civil war or violent secession. In times of crisis, the conception of the
30 It is important, however, to distinguish the long term aftermath from the immediate impact
and short term consequences of a terrorist attack. For example, the day of the September 11th
attacks, which resulted in around three thousand deaths, and subsequent days in which the
American nation had to cope with the shock of the sudden and unexpected attacks and with the
prospect of imminent future attacks, can be characterized fairly as a time of crisis. The long
period of disquiet that followed those first few weeks, however, seems better described as one of
stress than of crisis.
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good of self or other is so little integrated or accommodated within the
polity that all possible institutional resolutions of the conflict between
self and other will strike one or both of them as deeply insufficient,
unsatisfactory, and unjust.
Times of stress stand halfway between ordinary times and times of
crisis. In times of stress, there is less extensive and less successful
accommodation and integration of significantly represented conceptions
of the good within the polity. Self and other are less likely than in
ordinary times to consider institutional processes of conflict resolution
to be just or fair. The identity or unity of the common self that is
supposed to bind together the citizenry is not disintegrating, but it is
destabilized and under various pressures. Whereas a conventional war
may cause a crisis, terrorism and the war on terror seem more likely to
create stress. Indeed, unlike a military invasion, terrorist acts are likely
to be sporadic and widespread, causing more psychological than
physical harm. Having terrorists hidden within the polity’s population
is undoubtedly unnerving and can easily lead to overreactions, undue
suppression of fundamental rights, or exacerbation of ethnic or racial
prejudice such that certain selves and the conceptions of the good they
endorse may become increasingly unhinged. At some point, erosion of
accommodation of certain conceptions of the good may place increasing
strain on the working unity of the polity’s citizenry. In short, both the
threat posed by the terrorist—be he or she a foreign or a domestic one—
and the dangers posed by overreaction may fray the common glue that
binds the polity together. Thus, the dangers looming on the horizon in
times of stress may not be very different in nature than their
counterparts present in times of crisis. Nevertheless, in times of stress,
these dangers are markedly less imminent and less intense.
That the current war on terror gives rise to conditions of stress
rather than of crisis is well captured in the following passage from Lord
Hoffman’s opinion in the A(FC) case:
[The United Kingdom] is a nation that has been tested in adversity,
which has survived physical destruction and catastrophic loss of life.
I do not underestimate the ability of fanatical groups of terrorists to
kill and destroy, but they do not threaten the life of the nation.
Whether we would survive Hitler hung in the balance, but there is no
doubt that we shall survive Al-Qaeda. The Spanish people have not
said that what happened in Madrid, hideous crime as it was,
threatened the life of their nation. Their legendary pride would not
allow it. Terrorist violence, serious as it is, does not threaten our
institutions of government or our existence as a civil community.31

31 A(FC) v. Sec’y of State of the Home Dep’t [2004] UKHL 56, [2005] 2 A.C. 68, 132 (H.L.)
(appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.) (Lord Hoffman, concurring).
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The Criminal Law, Law of War, and Police Power Law Paradigms

Both ordinary criminals and soldiers in the armies of foreign
enemies can pose threats to the lives and security of the members of a
polity. The law, however, treats suspected criminals and captured
enemy soldiers very differently. Following arrest, suspected criminals
must be charged, tried, convicted, and sentenced before they can be
legitimately confined to prison for a determinate maximum period of
time. Moreover, in constitutional democracies, such as the United
States for example, criminal defendants are afforded certain categorical
constitutionally protected rights, such as the right against selfincrimination,32 the right to counsel,33 and the right to confront
witnesses that testify against them,34 to secure an acceptable minimum
of procedural fairness. Such rights as well as other norms and
protections, such as the requirement that the state prove its case against
the accused “beyond a reasonable doubt,” frame the “criminal law
paradigm.”
In contrast, captured foreign enemy soldiers who are not in
violation of the laws of war can only be detained consistent with
applicable norms of the international law so as to prevent them from
further participation in the military conflict on the side of the captor’s
foreign enemies.35 Such prisoners of war must be treated humanely, are
exempt from all but a minimum of clearly defined interrogation, and are
to be released without undue delay upon termination of hostilities.36 In
short, these as well as other legally binding norms that set the legitimate
bounds for the treatment of prisoners of war in the context of
conventional military hostilities among two or more nation-states
circumscribe the “law of war paradigm.”
In addition to requiring neutralization of criminals and foreign
soldiers fighting against the country’s armed forces, the security of that
country’s citizenry may require further restraints impinging on the
citizenry as a whole or on some distinct groups within it. For example,
a city plagued by rampant youth-gang violence may improve security
for its inhabitants by imposing a general curfew or one confined to all
residents below a certain age. More generally, special security needs
arising because of certain specific threats—for instance, threats posed
32
33
34
35

See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
See id. amend. VI.
See id.
See generally Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
36 Id. arts. 13, 17, and 118.

2088

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27:5

by terrorists, the spread of deadly contagious disease, a natural disaster,
organized crime—call for government measures for the protection of
the citizenry that are bound to impinge on the protection or exercise of
certain fundamental rights, such as freedom of movement or assembly,
privacy, etc. In these circumstances, the constitutional state must seek
to harmonize liberty and security through a balancing process. The
legal-constitutional underpinnings of such a balancing process as well
as the specific legal norms it engenders give shape to the “police power
law paradigm.”
In its initial reaction to the 9/11 attacks, the Bush Administration
seemingly could not make up its mind concerning whether the
terrorists’ acts were acts of war by a transnational state-sponsored and
-supported organized terrorist network, or the criminal acts of Osama
Bin-Laden and several dozen co-conspirators.37
Similarly, the
American and British war on terror judicial decisions examined below
do not appear consistent in their handling of the distinction between
crime and war. Moreover, some of the judges involved treated issues
arising out of the war on terror as falling under the criminal law
paradigm while other judges tackled these same issues as if they fitted
neatly within the law of war paradigm. As the following analysis of
these cases will demonstrate, neither of these two paradigms is
satisfactory for dealing with cases pitting liberty against security in the
context of the war on terror.
For their part, the two Israeli cases deal with restrictions on the
liberties of the civilian populations in the occupied territories in the
West Bank and Gaza. These restrictions were meant to enhance the
security of the Israeli citizenry against acts of terror, by means of both
defensive—the building of a separation barrier involving walls, fences,
etc., in the West Bank—and offensive—chasing terrorists and
destroying homes to frustrate arms smuggling from Egypt in Gaza—
military operations.38 Notwithstanding that these operations were
military in nature and that they were conducted in the context of the war
on terror, the Israeli Supreme Court treated the two cases it decided as if
they belonged to the police power law paradigm. As will be explained
below, this paradigm is unsatisfactory from the standpoint of balancing
liberty and security in the context of the effect of military actions on
civilian bystanders in the theater of the war on terror. Ultimately, all
37 See generally George Fletcher’s observation that following September 11, 2001, the Bush
Administration could not decide whether the attacks in New York and Washington amounted to a
“collective crime of al-Qaeda and the Taliban, in which case war is the proper response, or the
individual crime of Osama bin Laden and other[s,] . . . in which case a criminal prosecution is the
correct action.” George P. Fletcher, War and the Constitution, THE AM. PROSPECT, Jan. 1, 2002,
at 26.
38 See infra Part III.
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three paradigms used in the six cases under consideration are wanting in
the context of the war on terror, hence calling for the articulation of a
new paradigm, which will be attempted in Part VI below.

C.

Proportionality and Balancing

In all three jurisdictions judicial balancing played a key role in the
disposition of the claims arising in the context of the war on terror. The
Israeli Supreme Court applied a proportionality test, the Law Lords
relied on both proportionality and balancing, and the U.S. Supreme
Court used balancing.39
Proportionality and balancing are not
synonymous, but they seem to overlap significantly, particularly since
balancing proper forms part of proportionality tests such as that used by
the Israeli Court.40
On first impression, balancing in relation to conflicts between
liberty and security seems simple and straightforward enough. Both
liberty and security are social goods, and the pursuit of one sometimes
comes into conflict with the realization of the other. When the pursuit
of liberty threatens security or vice versa, the equilibrium between the
two must be reestablished by sufficiently restricting the threat to allow
for an adequate level of realization of the threatened social good.
Consistent with that endeavor, the cost due to the burden imposed on
the impinging social good must be weighed against the benefit that
results for the threatened social good.
Furthermore, from an
institutional standpoint, the legislature and/or the executive power is
responsible for devising measures designed to cope with the relevant
threat. The judiciary, in turn, is charged with determining whether
implementation of such measures is compatible with maintaining a
suitable equilibrium between the two social goods involved, by
weighing the benefits the measures in question confer on one social
good against the costs that such measures impose on the other social
good.
Judicial balancing would work best and be most transparent if the
social goods subjected to balancing were both quantifiable and
comparable. Thus, if total liberty weighed as much in units of good as
total security; and if each unit of added cost or benefit to liberty would
be the equivalent to the correlative unit with respect to security; and
finally, if the aggregate of liberty and security were always zero-sum;
39
40

See supra note 2.
See infra Part III.
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then judicial balancing could be thoroughly principled and accurate as
well as completely transparent. Actually, however, judicial balancing
involving liberty and security is anything but simple, straightforward, or
transparent. The benefits of liberty or security may not be quantifiable,
and even if quantifiable, they may not be comparable. Finally, it is
highly questionable that the relation between the two is a zero-sum one:
most likely, there is no liberty without security, and security without
liberty is not a worthy pursuit.
A further objection against balancing liberty against security stems
from the fact that liberty interests are, to a significant degree, protected
as constitutional rights—e.g., freedom of speech, of assembly, against
arbitrary detention—whereas security interests constitute, to a large
extent, a collective social good. Consistent with this, if constitutional
liberty rights could be simply weighed against non-constitutional
interests, such as a societal interest in maximizing security, they would
fall victim to ordinary legislative policy-making, which consists of
working out tradeoffs among competing collective interests.41 To avoid
this, constitutional rights may be exempted from weighing and only
subject to categorical limitations—e.g., pornography is not speech,
speech can only be prohibited if it incites to violence—or following
Dworkin, they may be subjected to weighing, but susceptible to being
outweighed only by the most weighty social policy goals.42 In other
words, in Dworkin’s view, limitations of constitutional rights can only
be justified if their costs to rights holders are far outweighed by the
benefit to be produced through the institution of pressing social policy.
These last observations suggest that the conflict between liberty
and security may not be susceptible to resolution through simple
balancing, though it may be amenable to some kind of comparative
weighing with some handicapping of the weights of non-constitutional
interests as against constitutional interests. Such handicapping can be
given concrete content—i.e., by how much must pressing social policy
benefits outweigh correlative costs to constitutional interests—by
recourse to the concept of proportionality.
From a theoretical standpoint, the concept of proportionality can be
traced back to Aristotle’s conception of justice and equality, which
requires that equals be treated equally and unequals unequally.43
Treating equals unequally or unequals equally is disproportionate, as is
treating unequals more unequally than they are unequal.44 From the
41 For a general critique of judicial balancing in constitutional adjudication, see T. Alexander
Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943 (1987).
42 See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 92, 95-96 (1977).
43 See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, bk. V (Martin Ostwald trans., Prentice Hall
1962).
44 For example, if stealing $100 is punishable by ten days in prison and stealing $300 by
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standpoint of the application of a proportionality standard to resolve
conflicts between constitutional rights and social policies for the
collective good, on the other hand, two factors loom as paramount: (1)
constitutional rights and social policies embodied in legislation or
executive decrees are of unequal value such that tradeoffs based on a
simple calculus of utilities would be disproportionate; and (2) even
when a particular social policy is of such vast importance that curtailing
conflicting constitutional rights would not be disproportionate—for
example, when an executive decree issued in the context of a struggle
for national survival during an emergency partially restricts freedom of
movement and assembly—the resulting limitations on, or suspensions
of, the constitutional rights involved must not be themselves
disproportionate. In other words, even when it is not disproportionate to
limit a constitutional right in the pursuit of a vitally important collective
end, the means employed to that end should not impinge on the right at
stake more than is necessary to achieve the end.
Consistent with the first of the factors above, proportionality in
relation to constitutional rights requires treating these rights and
conflicting collective goods as unequals. How unequal the rights and
goods must be treated so that they are proportionately rather than
disproportionately unequal cannot be determined without reference to
substantive normative criteria that lie outside of the realm of
proportionality. For example, racist speech is likely to be deeply
offensive to a large majority within the polity, but mere discomfort with
it, standing alone, would not justify its suppression. On the other hand,
in some countries it is constitutional—and hence deemed
proportional—to prohibit racist speech that incites racial hatred,
whereas in the United States, only speech that incites racial violence
may be thus prohibited.45 Assuming the racist’s right to communicate
racist views and the discomfort of the audience reached by such views
to involve equivalent costs and benefits absent the input of
constitutional considerations; and assuming that incitement to violence
imposes a greater collective cost on the polity than does incitement to
hatred;46 then limiting free speech because of discomfort would be
disproportionate. However, whether either incitement to hatred or
thirty days, it is disproportionate to punish stealing $200 by a year in prison.
45 Compare The Queen v. Keegstra [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 (Can.) (upholding criminal
conviction of high school teacher who taught anti-Semitic propaganda to his students) with Collin
v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978) (holding that proposed NeoNazi march in Nazi military uniforms including swastika in suburb heavily populated by Jewish
Holocaust survivors does not amount to incitement to violence and hence cannot be prohibited).
46 This assumption is by no means self-evident. Arguably, incitement to hatred is in the long
run as, or more, pernicious than incitement to violence as it may spread undetected evils that may
prove eventually more destructive of a polity’s social fabric.
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incitement to violence or else both of these would render such
limitations disproportionate would depend on values extrinsic to
proportionality. Such values may be embodied in a constitutional text,47
found in the collective identity of a polity,48 or elaborated by judges in
the course of adjudicating constitutional claims.49
Consistent with the second factor listed above, on the other hand,
proportionality concerns the means employed to achieve
constitutionally permissible ends. In this context, proportionality
requires a “fit” between means and ends. When some important
collective objective justifies limitation of some constitutional right, the
permissible intrusion on that right should be the minimum possible
consistent with achieving the objective. A perfect fit is achieved when
the right-restricting means to a permissible end are neither overinclusive—they restrict no one who does not threaten achievement of
the relevant end—nor under-inclusive—they do not fail to restrict those
who would otherwise frustrate achievement of the aforesaid end.
Moreover, were a perfect fit possible, the proportionality of means
would involve neither comparison nor weighing, but only fine tuning to
come into full compliance with the requirement to avoid all over- or
under-inclusiveness.
In the real world, however, it is rarely, if ever, possible to achieve a
perfect fit. For example, if one could predict with accuracy who will
perpetrate a terrorist act unless restrained, it would be possible to assure
security from terrorism by means of restrictions on all those and only
those determined to carry out terrorist acts. But since that is impossible,
the best possible fit is bound to be one that is both under- and overinclusive, one that will not sufficiently restrict all would-be terrorists
and that will inevitably target some who would never engage in terrorist
acts.
47 See, e.g., Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which protects
freedom of expression but allows for such “restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and
are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity, or
public safety . . . .” European Convention on Human Rights art. 10, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S.
221. ECHR rights are formally treaty-based ones, but they are nonetheless the functional
equivalents of constitutional rights.
See NORMAN DORSEN ET AL., COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONALISM: CASES AND MATERIALS 2 (2003).
48 The difference between the Canadian and American treatment of hate speech, see supra
note 45, may be due to the contrast between Canadian multiculturalism and American
individualism. See MICHEL ROSENFELD, JUST INTERPRETATIONS: LAW BETWEEN ETHICS AND
POLITICS 186-87 (1998).
49 Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that limitation of freedom of speech cannot be
justified unless in furtherance of a “compelling” state interest. See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504
U.S. 191 (1992). Similarly, racial classifications cannot be upheld absent compliance with a
“strict scrutiny test.” This test requires that there be a compelling state interest and the means
used in pursuit of that interest be “necessary.” See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214
(1944).
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In our imperfect world, the best fit is one that, though over- and
under-inclusive, is nonetheless least restrictive of liberty and equality
rights. Indeed, all relevant rights in relation to the war on terror and to
the six cases examined below, namely, besides liberty and equality
rights proper, due process rights, habeas corpus rights, privacy rights
and the right to use and enjoy one’s property, are at a higher level of
abstraction reducible to liberty and/or equality rights.50 Moreover,
liberty and equality rights are sometimes complementary and sometimes
in conflict with one another. For example, if most international
terrorists happen to be Muslim, then imposing restrictions on the rights
of Muslims alone may be less restrictive from the standpoint of liberty
than extending such restrictions to all persons within the polity. But
since the vast majority of Muslims have no ties to terrorism, imposing
the restrictions on them as a group would disproportionately impinge on
their rights to equality.
A proportionate fit in an imperfect world, therefore, is one that is
least practically restrictive of liberty and equality rights, and that strikes
a balance between restrictions on liberty rights and those on equality
rights when the two are in conflict. To perform these tasks, moreover,
requires comparing alternative means to determine which provide a
better fit, and weighing the costs of restrictions on liberty against those
on equality to strike a proper balance and to avoid excessive restrictions
on either of them.
In short, the first factor of proportionality involves balancing, but it
is balancing on a scale that is weighted in favor of constitutional rights.
The second factor is likely to include comparisons of costs and benefits
of alternative means to the same end, but these are unlikely to involve
straightforward balancing in as much as they relate to tradeoffs between
restrictions on liberty and restrictions on equality for purposes of
achieving something else, such as, in the cases that concern us here,
security. Balancing proper, however, has a place within broader
proportionality analysis. Such balancing is appropriate in two kinds of
situations: those involving direct conflicts between two rights; and those
relating to the uncertainties surrounding the likelihood that, and degree
to which, legislative or executive means will significantly advance a
collective end that is of such great importance as to justify some
limitations on constitutional rights.
In the case of a conflict between liberty and equality in the pursuit
of security, the rights are pitted against one another indirectly. The
50 For example, privacy involves liberty to make decisions within the sphere of intimate
decisions, see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), while dignity requires both liberty
to make choices for oneself and equality inasmuch as treatment of any person as an inferior
results in a deprivation of dignity.
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object is to achieve security without undue impingements on liberty or
equality and without disproportionate sacrifice of one to the other. The
primary goal, however, is the achievement of security with the least
possible overall limitation on rights, and that goal may well be best
achieved with a greater limitation on equality than on liberty or vice
versa. In a direct conflict, in contrast, benefits and burdens related to
one right are measured exclusively against those pertaining to another
conflicting right and the resolution of the conflict in question is properly
reached through balancing proper. For example, if a journalist’s
freedom of the press right clashes with a private person’s privacy right,
as where the journalist wants to publish a story about that person’s
intimate life, the burden on freedom of the press that prohibition of
publication would entail would have to be weighed directly against the
burden on privacy that such publication would cause.
Concerning the second situation identified above, the probability
that a particular means will lead to the achievement of a targeted end
plays an important role in determining proportionality and often calls
for balancing proper. For example, capture and detention of a person
who one knows with one hundred percent certainty is about to detonate
a dirty bomb in the center of a city that would cause at least 100,000
deaths would provide a huge boost to security. In that case, the benefit
to security far outweighs any corresponding burden on liberty. But
what if there is only one chance in one thousand that the person in
indefinite detention is a would-be bomber? And what if the chance of
any such bomb’s detonating and causing serious casualties is only one
in ten thousand? More generally, are significant restrictions on
everyone’s liberty in order to be in a slightly stronger position in the
war on terror justified assuming that, at worst, terrorism will cause a
number of fatalities amounting to a fraction of those due to highway
accidents?
To answer these questions properly, the gravity of a threat to
security must be measured in relation to its degree of probability and
any relevant net decrease in liberty must be weighed against the
corresponding net increase in security—i.e., the aimed level of
increased security discounted by the probability of its achievement.
Thus, actual achievement of collective security may be proportionate to
even extensive limitation of rights. For example, under conditions of
crisis in the face of a foreign armed invasion, considerations of national
security in the struggle for survival would justify extensive curtailment
of constitutional rights. In contrast, a slight increase in security in
ordinary times may not suffice to justify any curtailment of such rights.
Furthermore, even if it is stipulated that the war on terror involves
weighty security objectives that justify significant restrictions on
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constitutional rights, policies that would only marginally improve
security against terrorists would be outweighed by any significant
corresponding burden on liberty rights. And, conversely, policies that
would in all likelihood dramatically improve security would justify
substantial limitations on such rights.
In the last analysis, proportionality analysis comprises measuring,
“fitting,” comparing and balancing in relation to normative standards or
values that transcend proportionality itself.
Responsibility for
proportionality can be entrusted to legislators, members of the executive
branch or to judges, or it can be apportioned among all of them. How
much of proportionality analysis and balancing is left to judges depends
on many factors, including the particular constitutional order involved
and the particular nature of the legislation and/or executive decrees at
stake. Furthermore, how much of, and what kind of, proportionality
analysis and balancing should be optimally left to judges is also contextdependent, as will be illustrated by examination of the cases below.
Finally, when proportionality standards have been set by the legislature
and when balancing is embodied in legislation, whether ordinary or
constitutional, a judge applying such legislation or evaluating it in
connection with a constitutional challenge may be pretty much limited
to performing a categorical determination.51 Moreover, whether
proportionality or balancing is factored into particular constitutional or
legislative provisions is not always clear. For example, are the
constitutional rights afforded criminal defendants under the U.S.
Constitution the product of balancing the liberty and dignity interests of
individuals against the security and public order interests of the polity?
Or, are they the expression of a categorical protection of individual
liberty and dignity regardless of consequences?
D.

Background Conditions: Contrasting the War on Terror in the
United States, Israel, and the United Kingdom

As noted at the outset, the factual circumstances of the cases in the
three relevant jurisdictions were quite varied, as were the experiences
with terrorism of each of the three countries.52 Moreover, at least from
51 A clear example of such categorical determination is provided by Justice Scalia’s
dissenting opinion in the Hamdi case. See infra Part II, p. 2120. As Justice Scalia sees it, the
balance between liberty interests protected through the right of habeas corpus as against collective
security interests are balanced within the U.S. Constitution itself in as much as the latter
prescribes criteria for when habeas corpus claims should prevail against conflicting security
claims, and in as much as it specifies the conditions under which the right to habeas corpus may
be suspended. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 9, cl. 2.
52 See supra Introduction, pp. 2085-87.
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a formal standpoint, the legal issues differed significantly from one
country to the next. The U.S. cases dealt mainly with the constitutional
rights of persons being detained for long and indeterminate periods;53
the Israeli cases with the rights of Palestinian civilians under the
international law of occupation and Israeli administrative law in the
context of Israeli military operations in the occupied territories;54 and
the British case, with the rights of detained foreign nationals who could
not be deported to their home countries under the European Convention
on Human Rights (ECHR) and the United Kingdom’s Human Rights
Act of 1998 granting the ECHR domestic effect.55 Given these
differences, it is necessary to take a closer look at the context of
terrorism in each country to establish suitable parameters of
comparison.
Besides the differences in the number of terrorist incidents noted
above—one for the United States, 780 for Israel and none for the United
Kingdom at the time of the Law Lords’ decision (but two since)—and
the proportionately greater magnitude of casualties in Israel than in the
United States—fifteen times higher in proportion to total population56—
there is another important difference between the three countries.
Palestinian terrorism arises in the context of a long-standing conflict
between two neighboring peoples involving an occupation and
vehemently disputed territorial claims. Al Qaeda-led or -inspired
terrorism against the United States and the United Kingdom, in contrast,
originates in distant places such as Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia and
appears to be driven by a virulent strand of religious fundamentalism.57
Thus, in Israel it is the means by which Palestinians carry out their
struggle—suicide bombings that target civilians within Israel’s pre-1967
borders—rather than the struggle itself that are shocking and utterly
unacceptable.58 In the United States, however, both the means and ends
53
54
55
56
57

See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
The 2005 London attacks present another variant. These were apparently the work of
domestic residents inspired by a virulent foreign ideology. See Tod Robberson, How are
Radicals Reeling in Brits? As Angry Young Muslims Fall Under Spell, Officials Set Sights on
‘Preachers of Hate’, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July 16, 2005, at 1A.
58 This last statement is not meant to convey any moral or political judgment regarding the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Instead the statement seeks to underscore that even from a subjective
Israeli standpoint the political conflict between Israel and the Palestinians is an accepted fact of
life, with Israelis divided along a political spectrum that ranges from some who want to make no
territorial concessions to the Palestinians to some who favor dismantling all settlements in the
West Bank and Gaza, as well as returning Israel to its pre-1967 borders. See, e.g., Louisa Brooke,
Jan.
23,
2003,
Politics
and
The
Palestinian
Issue,
BBC
NEWS,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/2683613.stm. On the other hand, there is a strong
consensus among Israelis that suicide bombings are completely unacceptable and utterly
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of Al Qaeda-led terrorism loom as largely incomprehensible and
absolutely unacceptable.59
When the differences concerning the frequency of terrorist attacks
and concerning the socio-political context in which terrorism arises60
are added up, they clearly indicate that terrorism is much less
“distant”—both in a physical and psychological sense—and much more
constant in Israel than in the United States or the United Kingdom.61
Thus, although the threat from terrorism is as unpredictable—at least in
terms of the times and places of future terrorist attacks—and equally as
devastating in Israel as in the United States or the United Kingdom, it is
much more a present day-to-day reality in Israel than in the other two
countries. In addition, for the most part, Palestinian terrorism since
2000 has mainly consisted of suicide bombings,62 hence fomenting
reprehensible regardless of their causes, motives or objectives. See Danny Rubinstein, The Price
of Winning Equation, HAARETZ.COM., June 28, 2004, http://www.haaretz.com.
59 President Bush has repeatedly asserted that Al Qaeda terrorists seek to attack the United
States because “[t]hey hate our freedoms.” See, e.g., 147 CONG. REC. S9553, S9554 (2001)
(address of President George W. Bush). But even if they hate America’s freedoms, why would
they travel half way around the world and commit suicide in order to disrupt its way of life? One
plausible answer is that they are zealots fulfilling their religious duties pursuant to the order of
their fundamentalist leaders. But even if that is the right answer, it is hardly comprehensible to
most Americans whether religious or secular. It bears emphasizing, however, that the fact that,
from an American standpoint, Al Qaeda terrorism has no rational basis or purpose and that it is
fueled by fanatical hatred does not mean that it lacks justification from the subjective standpoint
of many of those who share the terrorists’ religious ideology. Indeed, the latter do not merely
regard American culture and mores as an abominable way of life in a far away place, but also as a
grave threat to their own societies’ way of life. In this vision, the global spread of American
economic power, ideology and culture poses a grave threat against Islam. Moreover, many in the
Islamic world who reject terror as a legitimate means to combat the spread of American influence
nevertheless agree that such influence poses a threat to their way of life. See, e.g., Husain
Haqqani, In the Bylanes of the War on Terror, INDIAN EXPRESS, July 12, 2003,
http://www.indianexpress.com/archive_frame.php.
60 The difference in context between a concretely grounded local conflict and a generalized
fleeting global one clearly seems to be the most relevant one in terms of the court decisions that
are the principal focus of the present analysis. Nevertheless, this is not to deny that at some
deeper level there may be a greater convergence between the two respective contexts. Indeed, the
Palestinian circumstances giving rise to suicide bombers may be regarded as part of the
intensifying Kulturkampf between militant Islam and the West. In this connection, were the
scenes of public rejoicing among certain Palestinian crowds immediately after the September
11th attacks prompted by a perception of the United States as Israel’s principal ally and
supporter? Or were the attacks also perceived as a proud moment in the struggle between militant
Islam and the West? See Ronni Gordon Stillman, Arafat’s Press: What the Palestinian Authority
Gets Away With, NAT’L REV. ONLINE, Sept. 20, 2001, http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/
comment-stillman092001.shtml (describing Palestinians celebrating in streets upon hearing about
the 9/11 attacks); World Shock Over U.S. Attacks, CNN.COM, Sept. 11, 2001,
http://edition.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/europe/09/11/trade.centre.reaction/ (reporting Islamic Jihad
stating that the 9/11 attacks were “a consequence of American policies in this region”).
61 For the United Kingdom, this is true with respect to terrorist threats posed by Al Qaeda, but
not with respect to those posed by domestic terrorists, such as those associated with the struggle
in Northern Ireland. For present purposes, however, the focus will remain on the former.
62 There have also been cases where other methods were used, such as the explosion at the
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predictability concerning the means of terror without thereby affecting
that terror’s lethal nature or the randomness of its time and place. In
contrast, as of this writing, there has not been any terrorist attack in the
United States since September 11, 2001, though threats and plots may
abound.63 Moreover, as vividly illustrated by the terrorist attacks on
commuter trains in Madrid on March 11, 2004,64 and on London
subway trains and buses in July 2005, future terrorist attacks in the
United States or the United Kingdom may take a vast array of different
forms causing death and destruction of varying orders of magnitude.
Such attacks may be on railroads, seaports, bridges, shopping centers, or
chemical or nuclear plants, and they may involve ordinary explosives,
biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons.65 Consistent with this
ongoing threat, in its current status, the American or British war on
terror seems to have to entrust more to the imagination than its Israeli
counterpart. That is not to say that the American or British war is
imaginary, but rather that imagination may blow the threats out of
proportion while, at the same time, failures in imagination may leave
the country inadequately prepared for future attacks that could prove
particularly lethal.
The difference concerning the greater role for imagination in the
American and British contexts has implications for all branches of
government, including the judicial branch, as it seems particularly
important in relation to judicial balancing. Indeed, any balancing
between security and rights would seem more reliable in a situation in
which threats to security tend to be constant and foreseeable than in a
situation in which such threats are both speculative and subject to great
variations.66

Hebrew University in Jerusalem, which was set by a bomb left in a cafeteria. See Jerusalem Blast
Kills 7; 4 Americans Among Dead, CNN.com, Aug. 1, 2002, http://edition.cnn.com/
2002/WORLD/meast/07/31/mideast/.
63 See e.g., David Johnston & Eric Lichtblau, Tourist Copters in New York City a Terror
Target, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2004, at A1.
64 See Keith B. Richburg & Fred Barbash, Madrid Bombings Kill at Least 190: Al QaedaLinked Group Claims Responsibility, WASHINGTONPOST.COM, Mar. 11, 2004,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A48577-2004/Mar11?language=printer.
65 See Karen Roebuck, Are We Safe?, PITTSBURGHLIVE.COM, Sept. 11, 2003
http://www.pittsburghlive.com/x/search/s_154178.html (stressing the vulnerability of a stadium,
railroads, bridges, shopping malls, etc.); Brian Ross, Portable Terror: Suitcase Nukes Raise
Nov.
8,
2001,
http://archive.org
(type
Concern,
ABCNEWS.COM,
“http:abcnews.go.com/sections/primetime/2020/ross011108.html” into Way Back Machine and
click “Take Me Back”) (quoting President Bush’s concern that Bin Laden is seeking nuclear,
chemical and biological weapons).
66 See Cass R. Sunstein, Fear and Liberty, 71 SOC. RES. 967, 968 (2004) (arguing that fear
exacerbated by uncertainly may so skew perceptions of dangers as to undermine reliability of
judicial balancing).
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As already noted, the Israeli cases arose in a very different setting
than their American or British counterparts.67 The Israeli cases concern
ongoing military operations and involve requests to the courts to
intervene in order to change the course of such operations in significant
ways. In one case, the Israeli Supreme Court ordered that the location
of the separation barrier between Israel and the West Bank being
constructed by the military be moved in some places to reduce the
losses, inconveniences and disruptions that its erection had caused to
Palestinians who owned land, lived, or worked nearby.68 In the other
case discussed below, the Israeli Supreme Court ordered some changes
in the conduct of an ongoing military operation in Gaza.69 Although the
Israeli Court made bold use of proportionality analysis in these cases,
ongoing military operations seem inherently ill-suited for judicial
intervention, let alone for subjection to judicial balancing. This is both
because of their very nature, which makes them heavily dependent on
military expertise and the ability to take prompt and decisive action
under constantly changing circumstances, and because of the inherently
political nature—and in many cases, including the operations at stake in
the Israeli cases, highly politically controversial nature—of military
policy.70
To subject purely military policy to judicial review seems
inappropriate unless it can be plausibly attacked as contrary to law. But
even in the latter case, there would seem to be little room for judicial
balancing.71 Moreover, when judicial balancing zeroes in on the
67
68

See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
See Beit Sourik, supra note 1, para. 9. In a subsequent case relating to another segment of
the separation barrier, Mara’abe v. The Prime Minister of Israel, the Israeli Supreme Court
ordered the IDF to determine whether a suggested alternative location for the barrier less
injurious to Palestinian civilians would be a plausible option from the standpoint of protecting
Israeli security. HCJ 7957/04 Mara’abe v. The Prime Minister of Israel [2005] [hereinafter
Mara’abe]. See id. at paras. 114, 116.
69 See Physicians for Human Rights, supra note 1, paras. 4, 39.
70 The Palestinian plaintiffs in the case relating to construction of the separation barrier
alleged that the latter was illegal as a means for Israel to unilaterally draw permanent boundaries
thereby definitely annexing significant portions of the West Bank. The Israeli Supreme Court
rejected this claim and held the construction of the barrier to be for security reasons. See Beit
Sourik, supra note 1, paras. 28–30; see also Mara’abe, supra note 68, para. 98 (same conclusion
notwithstanding International Court of Justice decision discussed infra note 71).
71 For example, in its advisory opinion on the separation barrier rendered on July 9, 2004, the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) concluded, inter alia, that construction of portions of the
barrier in occupied territory was in violation of international law. In reaching this conclusion the
Court reviewed the relevant facts to determine whether they were consistent with the
requirements imposed by applicable customary and treaty-based norms of international law. See
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136 (Jul. 9). The Israeli Supreme Court reviewed this advisory
opinion in its Mara’abe decision and concluded that the two courts agreed on the applicable legal
standards but not on the facts. According to the Israeli Court, the ICJ did not have the full facts
before it and did not engage in any proportionality analysis. See Mara’abe, supra note 68, at
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conduct of military affairs itself, such as the determination of whether
large gatherings of Palestinian civilians should be permitted in the
context of Israeli antiterrorist military operations in Gaza,72 courts seem
to lack expertise to weigh different military options. Finally, even if
courts had such expertise, the constantly moving and changing nature of
ongoing military action would appear to be sufficient by itself to
underscore the unsuitable nature of judicial intervention under such
circumstances.73
Because of the Israeli Court’s bold use of proportionality analysis
under circumstances so seemingly inappropriate for judicial balancing,
close examination of its decisions seems particularly promising for
purposes of elucidating the potential and pitfalls of judicial balancing in
the context of the war on terror. If such balancing proves in the end
defensible, then proportionality analysis may have much greater value
in the context of the war on terror than conventional wisdom suggests.
If not, then the Israeli cases are likely to provide vivid illustration of the
pitfalls of the balancing approach in connection with the war on terror.
The American cases stand in sharp contrast to their Israeli
counterparts with respect to judicial balancing. Not only, as will be
discussed below,74 because the American Court’s use of balancing
seems as narrow as the Israeli Court’s seems broad, but also because the
circumstances of the American cases seem as appropriate for balancing
as those of the Israeli cases seem inappropriate. Indeed, in the three
American cases, individuals long held in detention by the U.S. military
far from any theater of war were seeking a fair hearing to challenge the
validity of their confinement, thus pursuing vindication of basic due
process rights.75 Moreover, once the Court decided that the detainees
were entitled to due process,76 the judicial task became to determine
what process was due under the circumstances—a task that may require
judicial balancing to establish the appropriate level of protection in the
case at hand. As the U.S. Supreme Court stated in Mathews v.
Eldridge,77 a case it relied upon in its decision in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,78
para. 37-74.
72 See Physicians for Human Rights, supra note 1, paras. 24-30.
73 See discussion of Physicians for Human Rights infra Part III.
74 See infra Part II.
75 Besides asserting due process rights under the Fifth Amendment, the detainees advanced
other claims, such as their right to habeas corpus and certain rights under international law.
Whereas some of these latter claims may not be amenable to a balancing approach, resolution of
the due process claims was determinative for the disposition of the cases. For an extended
discussion of this point, see infra Part II.
76 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 481
(2004).
77 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
78 See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 529.
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the process due in a particular instance is to be determined by weighing
“the private interest that will be affected by the official action” against
the asserted Government interest “including the function involved” and
the burdens the Government would need to bear were it to afford greater
process.79 In short, judicial balancing is well established in procedural
due process cases. The reluctance with which the Court approached
balancing in the three cases before it therefore raises the question of
whether an otherwise routine judicial tool such as balancing becomes
problematic or inappropriate in cases arising out of the war on terror.
There is a parallel between the British case and the American
cases, particularly that concerning the Guantanamo detainees. The
Guantanamo case involved an attempt to create a Constitution-free
zone,80 whereas A(FC) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department
concerned illegitimate deprivation of fundamental rights due to misuse
of derogation powers.81 Indeed, Article 15 of the ECHR (incorporated
into British domestic law through the Human Rights Act of 1998)82
allows for derogation, in times of crisis and of emergency, from Article
5—its basic individual liberty and security of the person provision that
also guarantees due process rights—and from Article 14—its antidiscrimination provision.83 British post-9/11 antiterrorist legislation,
however, made for sweeping derogation, and the Attorney General took
the position that it was for Parliament and the Executive, not the courts,
to determine the nature of the threat to the country and the appropriate
response to it.84 Had that view prevailed, and had the political branches
determined that the threat posed by Al Qaeda created an emergency,
then those deprived of their rights because of derogation would be,
much like the Guantanamo detainees, left without basic rule of law
protections.
This danger could only be remedied by judicial
intervention.85
The British case also involves issues of proportionality and
balancing, particularly in relation to the determination of whether an
emergency existed such as to justify derogation. Accordingly, this case
brings proportionality analysis and balancing directly to bear on the
distinction between conditions of crisis, on the one hand, and ordinary
conditions and conditions of stress, on the other. This explicit treatment

79
80
81

See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
See Rasul, 542 U.S. 466.
A(FC) v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t [2004] UKHL 56, [2005] 2 A.C. 68 (H.L.)
(appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.).
82 See supra text accompanying note 55.
83 See A(FC), 2 A.C. at 92-93.
84 See id. at 107.
85 Id. at 110-11.
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of the three conditions is in contrast with the U.S. and Israeli cases,
which only deal with them implicitly.
Finally, brief mention must be made of the different legal regimes
applicable, respectively, to the cases in the United States, the United
Kingdom, and Israel. The American cases involve claims arising under
the U.S. Constitution, federal law, and international law. Israel does not
have a written constitution, and the Palestinians whose rights were at
stake in the two cases involved live in occupied territory governed by
laws of belligerent occupation. Consequently, the Israeli cases arise
under the law of belligerent occupation, Israeli administrative law, and
international law. In spite of these differences, in both Israel and the
United States similarly conceived fundamental rights86 are in conflict
with military policies and actions designed to promote the paramount
security interests of the country. For their part, the relevant legal norms
applicable in the British case come from the ECHR, an international
treaty, and from the Human Rights Act, a domestic statute.
Nonetheless, functionally, these applicable norms involve basic liberty,
equality, and due process rights. From the standpoint of judicial
balancing, therefore, the three legal regimes are sufficiently congruent
to allow for fruitful comparison.
II. JUDICIAL BALANCING AND THE AMERICAN DECISIONS
In only one of the three American decisions is judicial balancing
explicitly used, and even in that case, only by a plurality of four
justices.87 The other two decisions, though consistent with Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, do not rely on balancing as they concentrate on threshold
issues. In Rasul v. Bush, the Supreme Court’s focus was on whether the
foreign alleged “enemy combatants” held in Guantanamo were entitled
to the same rights to challenge their detention as those of their
American counterparts held in the United States.88 Finally, although
Rumsfeld v. Padilla raised the same substantive issues as Hamdi, the
Court decided the case on procedural grounds.89
86 The humanitarian rights at stake in Israel are for present purposes functionally equivalent
to American Due Process rights. The main difference is that the American cases deal mainly with
Procedural Due Process whereas the Israeli ones focus on rights that are roughly equivalent to
American Substantive Due Process rights.
87 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 539 (2004). Justices Ginsburg and Souter, who
concurred in part and dissented in part, can be said to have implicitly agreed to the plurality’s
balancing, as their disagreement with the latter was over whether the Congress had given the
Executive Branch authority to detain alleged “enemy combatants” indefinitely, and not over the
right to challenge detentions actually authorized by Congress. Id. at 540.
88 See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 484 (2004).
89 Padilla had sued the Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, for his allegedly
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The Bush Administration came close to embracing executive
unilateralism90 as its position in all three cases.91 The Court, however,
squarely rejected that position by subjecting Hamdi’s claims to judicial
balancing92 and acted consistent with that rejection in Rasul by refusing
to accept the Government’s position that, when it came to foreign
enemy combatant detainees, Guantanamo was beyond the reach of
American courts.93
Moreover, executive unilateralism has been
consistently rejected by the Supreme Court ever since the Civil War.94
Unlike the executive unilateralist position, the process-based
institutional approach involving judicial deference to the political
branches where presidential action is backed by congressional
authorization has been endorsed by the Court and appears to have been
determinative in some cases.95 Judicial use of the process-based
approach, however, has by no means been exclusive. Often, as was the
case in Hamdi’s plurality opinion, the process-based approach is
combined with judicial balancing. For the plurality in Hamdi, the
finding that detention of alleged enemy combatants was authorized by
Congress was but the first of two steps necessary to reach a proper
decision. This first step either leads to invalidation of the asserted
Executive authority if Congress has not provided for it, or it leads to a
necessary second step to determine through judicial balancing whether
unconstitutional detention. The Court held that the commander of the Navy brig where Padilla
was being held was the proper party for such a lawsuit, and hence dismissed the case against
Rumsfeld, without prejudice as to Padilla’s constitutional claims. See Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542
U.S. 426, 432 (2004).
90 See supra Introduction, p. 2088, for the three positions that have dominated the American
debate, of which “executive unilateralism” is one.
91 This position was not pressed all the way, for although the Bush Administration argued that
it was within the exclusive power of the President as Commander-in-Chief during a time of war
to designate a person as an “enemy combatant” and to detain the latter until the end of hostilities
(which in the case of the war against terror with potentially no certain end may mean
permanently), it did concede that the courts had limited jurisdiction to determine whether a
contested detention was within the authority of the Executive Branch, but not whether the
decision of the Executive Branch was right or wrong based on disputed facts. See Brief for
Respondents at 26, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (No. 03-6696). Thus, the courts
would be limited to an initial categorical inquiry. For example, the courts could decide that it is
not within the President’s war powers to designate as “enemy combatants” students on American
campuses who criticize his war policies. On the other hand, the Government assertion that
Hamdi was initially detained in Afghanistan where the United States was engaged in a war
against the Taliban would be all the information that a court would be entitled to before having to
accept the President’s exclusive power to determine whether or not to label Hamdi an enemy
combatant.
92 See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 529.
93 See Rasul, 542 U.S. at 483.
94 See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (The Steel Seizure Case), 343 U.S. 579
(1952); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866).
95 Compare Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (holding trial of civilian by military commission
without congressional authorization unconstitutional), with Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942)
(holding trial by military commission authorized by Congress constitutional).
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the exercise of the congressionally backed authority unduly tramples on
constitutionally protected liberties.96
Because the American Constitution does not provide for special
emergency powers, the need to balance security and rights is not
suspended in wars and other emergencies. In a country in which the
constitution specifically provides for special emergency powers, such as
France, the President may be entitled to his or her extraordinary powers
without having to accommodate fundamental rights.97 It is not the
same, however, when the U.S. President confronts a crisis, and even
executive unilateralists do not claim that it is.
Indeed, what
unilateralists argue is that the President is always obligated to uphold
civil liberties, including in times of emergency, but that in time of war,
because of his or her unique constitutional powers and responsibilities,
it is for the President rather than the courts to strike the proper balance
between security needs and fundamental liberties.98 Accordingly, the
Bush Administration’s argument for minimal judicial intervention in
connection with the enemy combatant detentions is not predicated on
the proposition that the President could disregard constitutional liberties
when fighting the war on terror. Instead, the argument in question relies
on a balancing approach, but insists that only the Executive is
competent and constitutionally empowered to conduct such balancing.
According to the Bush Administration, continued detention of
Hamdi more than two years after his initial capture in Afghanistan was
justified because it was a necessary means to achieving two compelling
government interests: gathering crucial intelligence in the war on terror
and preventing suspected terrorists in American custody from rejoining
the armed struggle against the United States.99 Moreover, the balancing
96 As already mentioned supra note 87, Justices Ginsburg and Souter concluded that Hamdi’s
detention was unconstitutional because in their view it was not authorized by Congress. See
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 540. The plurality, in contrast, found the detention congressionally
authorized, but concluded that, even in the context of the war on terror, Hamdi was entitled to
certain procedural rights that the Executive had theretofore refused to honor. See id. at 509.
97 See French 1958 Constitution, art. 16; see also DORSEN ET AL., supra note 47, at 330
(when exercising emergency powers, the French President can completely disregard fundamental
rights; the only recourse against abuse of emergency powers is impeachment proceedings by the
French Parliament.).
98 Cf. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 536 (even in the case of war, the “United States
Constitution . . . most assuredly envisions a role for all three branches when individual liberties
are at stake”); see also Brief for Respondents at 43-44, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004)
(No. 03-6696) (describing Department of Defense intent to provide counsel to American enemy
combatants and to allow them to challenge their detention once the military has determined that
such challenge would not thwart intelligence gathering essential for national security).
99 The Bush Administration argued that it had virtually complete exclusive authority
regarding enemy combatants because of the President’s Commander-in-Chief power. See U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. This might justify the inference that the Bush Administration’s claims
of exclusivity are ultimately based on a categorical assertion rather that on implementation of a
balancing approach were it not for the duty of the Executive Branch, even when acting
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in question is similar to that employed by courts when they adjudicate
other conflicts between government policy and fundamental rights
claims. Thus, for example, freedom of speech extends to all speech that
does not inevitably hinder the realization of compelling government
objectives.100 In other words, the Constitution accords great weight to
the free and uninhibited exchange of ideas. Nevertheless, government
objectives can outweigh speech claims if they can satisfy a stringent
strict scrutiny test.
In sum, the processes of balancing called for in the context of the
war on terror and in that of the garden-variety free speech case are
essentially identical. The only significant difference consistent with the
Bush Administration’s position is that in one case balancing is for the
Executive Branch while in the other it is for the courts. Does that
matter much? Is the Executive as capable or as accountable as the
Judiciary regarding such balancing? Does it matter that most cases
occur in ordinary times whereas the war on terror occurs under
conditions of crisis or stress? Finally, is the requisite balancing
associated with the war on terror beyond the competence of courts?
Before exploring how the three recent Supreme Court decisions
may shed light on these questions, brief mention must be made of how
the three different positions regarding how to reconcile security and
liberty in times of emergency should be further understood in terms of
the preceding observations.
First, all three positions involve balancing, albeit differing in terms
of who does the balancing and the kind of balancing involved. The
executive unilateralists want all balancing to be left to the President in
his or her capacity as Commander-in-Chief. On the other hand, civillibertarian maximalists want courts to do the balancing and want judges
to give no greater deference to government claims of compelling
security interests in times of emergency than to garden-variety
government compelling-interest claims in areas such as healthcare or
protection of the welfare of children.101 These two positions, therefore,
differ not only with respect to who shall do the balancing, but also with
unilaterally, to give fundamental liberties their due. See supra note 98. Although both the
categorical interpretation and that reliance on balancing are plausible, given the Executive’s
constitutional obligation regarding fundamental liberties, the latter interpretation clearly emerges
as the better one.
100 In the familiar terminology of the courts, government cannot deny protection to any
particular instance or kind of speech unless such denial meets the strict scrutiny test, i.e., such
denial constitutes a necessary means to the realization of a compelling government interest. See,
e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000).
101 See Issacharoff & Pildes,
supra note 15, at 297 (“[C]ivil libertarian
idealists . . . deny . . . that shifts in the institutional frameworks and substantive rules of the
liberty/security trade-offs do indeed regularly take place during times of serious security
threats.”).
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respect to the perspective from which such balancing shall be
approached. From the perspective of the President as Commander-inChief, security is the primary concern and therefore may tend to be
more heavily weighted even in the most scrupulous attempt to strike a
fair balance between liberty and security. From the perspective of the
judge, on the other hand, the preoccupation with fair balancing would
be paramount in the pursuit of striking a just and equitable equilibrium
between the demands of liberty and the constraints called for by the
need for security. Furthermore, from a civil-libertarian maximalist
perspective, the judicial branch has a special role in the protection of
fundamental rights since the political branches are particularly attuned
to majoritarian interests that may run counter to the protection of
fundamental rights, particularly those of minorities. Accordingly, from
a civil libertarian maximalist perspective, judges should perform the
requisite balancing, but they should place additional weight on
fundamental liberties to offset tendencies by the other branches and by
political majorities to overvalue security interests.102 And, in that view,
judges should do so even in an emergency or in times of stress.
The kind of balancing associated with the third position which
relies on a process-based institutional approach differs from the
balancing linked to the other two positions. As already noted, the third
position relies on institutional balancing, that is on “checks and
balances” between the Executive Branch and the Legislative Branch
rather than on direct actual balancing of security and liberty interests.103
On a purely inter-institutional level, the kind of balancing that is
associated with the process-based approach is exclusively indirect.
Actually, the inter-institutional dynamic is more likely to result in a
“check” than in a “balance.” Indeed, because the President and
Congress may be effectively answerable to somewhat different
constituencies,104 and because they have different, and even at times
antagonistic, institutional interests and priorities, they may each
approach the conflict between security and liberty somewhat differently.
In particular, because as Commander-in-Chief the President is prone to
increasing his or her power in times of emergency, Congress has an
institutional interest in acting in ways to keep presidential powers in
check. Furthermore, as each of the political branches has an internal
constitutional duty to strike a proper balance between security and
liberty, significant differences in how each branch strikes such balance
102 Cf. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) (stating that courts
should review with more exacting scrutiny laws that may impinge on rights guaranteed by the
Bill of Rights or on the rights of unpopular minorities).
103 See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
104 This could be due to differences between presidential politics and congressional politics,
and to the different majorities on whose respective backing they may each depend.
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may serve either as a check or as a balance. As a check: when one
branch disagrees with the other on how to draw the requisite balance, it
can withhold its necessary cooperation for purposes of expanding
governmental powers to deal with emergencies. On the other hand,
such disagreements can lead to further balancing as either branch can
fine tune its balancing to reach a workable consensus.
These three positions complement each other in that the respective
strengths of each make up for the respective weaknesses of the others.
Executive unilateralism is best equipped to meet security needs during
an emergency, but prone to undervaluing liberty or to treating it in a
rather perfunctory manner. Ordinary judicial balancing is most
transparent and best institutionally equipped to reconcile compelling
government interests and fundamental liberties, but may be ill-equipped
to properly assess threats to security or to cope with the complex and
rapidly changing circumstances prevalent in emergencies or special
circumstances such as those prompted by the war on terror. Finally,
process-based approaches lack the respective weaknesses of the other
two approaches—unilateralism and lack of expertise regarding
intelligence and security policy—but, by the same token, they fall short
of the respective strengths of the other two approaches—concentrated
and unitary decision-making in the face of dangerous and rapidly
changing circumstances and systematic and consistent balancing of
liberty and security. In theory at least, the combination of a processbased institutional approach with ordinary judicial balancing should
afford the greatest protection to fundamental liberties, and conversely,
executive unilateralism ought to be optimal to maximize security.105
Of the three Supreme Court decisions, Hamdi affords the best
opportunity to explore how balancing and the interplay between the
positions and approaches examined above may fare in practice. Indeed,
the four opinions filed in the case,106 taken collectively, represent all
these positions and approaches, and in addition, one of these opinions
relies on a categorical approach rather than on judicial balancing,107 thus
affording a glimpse into the contrast between these two approaches to
judicial decision-making.

105 It is of course possible that, on occasion, shared responsibility among the President and
Congress might prove best for security as the give and take between the two branches may lead to
a more efficient security policy than would have been the case had the President acted alone.
106 Justice O’Connor announced the decision of the Court and wrote a plurality opinion joined
by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy and Breyer. Justice Souter, joined by Justice
Ginsburg, filed an opinion concurring, in part, and dissenting, in part. Justice Scalia, joined by
Justice Stevens, filed a dissenting opinion. Finally, Justice Thomas filed another dissenting
opinion, which basically endorsed the Government’s position.
107 See the dissenting opinion of Justice Scalia. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 554-79
(2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Yasser Hamdi, born in Louisiana, moved to Saudi Arabia as a child
and was captured in 2001 in Afghanistan by the Northern Alliance, a
coalition of Afghan military groups opposed to the Taliban government,
which subsequently turned him over to the United States military.108
The latter detained and interrogated Hamdi in Afghanistan and then
transported him to Guantanamo.109 In 2002, upon learning that Hamdi
was a U.S. citizen, the military transferred him to the United States
where he remained in indefinite military detention.110
The
Government’s position was that Hamdi was an “enemy combatant” and
that as such he could be held indefinitely without formal charges or a
hearing until such time as the Government determined that access to
counsel or further proceedings would be warranted.111
Hamdi’s father filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleging
that his son was being illegally detained in violation of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments112 and international law, including the Geneva
Conventions on Prisoners of War.113 The petition asked the court to
order the Government to cease interrogating Hamdi, to declare Hamdi’s
detention unconstitutional, and to require that the Government either
press charges against Hamdi and provide him with counsel or release
him from detention.114 The petition also requested that the court order
an evidentiary hearing to deal with the conflicting factual assertions of
the parties concerning the circumstances surrounding Hamdi’s capture
and his transfer to the American military.115
The facts were indeed disputed. The Government asserted that
Hamdi had received military training from the Taliban and that he
became part of a Taliban unit with which he remained past September
11, 2001, when the United States commenced armed conflict against the
Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan.116 Hamdi was captured when his
Taliban unit surrendered to the Northern Alliance forces and he
thereafter “surrender[ed] his Kalashnikov assault rifle to [these
forces].”117 Upon being turned over to the United States military,
Hamdi was designated an “enemy combatant” because he was
associated with the Taliban, which was—at the time of his surrender

108
109
110
111
112
113

Id. at 510.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 510-11.
Id. at 511.
Id. at 515. Although some of the opinions in the case discussed the claims under
international law, evaluation of these claims is beyond the scope of this Article.
114 Id. at 511.
115 Id.
116 Id. at 512-13.
117 Id. at 513.
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and at the time of the Court’s decision—engaged in military conflict
against the United States.118
For his part, Hamdi’s father asserted that his son had traveled to
Afghanistan to do “relief work,” that he had not been long enough in the
country prior to September 11th to receive military training, and that as
someone traveling alone for the first time he was “trapped” in that
country once the military hostilities began.119
Although the case raises a large number of issues, the plurality
opinion by Justice O’Connor hones in on the factual dispute concerning
the propriety of Hamdi’s designation as an enemy combatant after
briefly dealing with two other issues. The plurality opinion, however,
provides the most comprehensive account of the appropriate role of
judicial balancing in the context of the conflict between security and
liberty in an ongoing war against terror.
The two threshold issues dealt with briefly by the plurality opinion
were the legal criteria for designation as an enemy combatant and
whether the President acting alone has authority to detain enemy
combatants indefinitely or whether congressional authorization was also
required.
Concerning the first of these issues, the plurality
acknowledged that large, difficult, and, to a significant extent,
unprecedented questions were raised regarding the handling of enemy
combatants in the novel, frequently unconventional, and potentially
interminable war against terror.120 Nevertheless, by focusing on
Hamdi’s circumstances narrowly, the plurality managed to avoid the
most vexing questions. Furthermore, concerning the second issue, the
plurality, contrary to Justices Souter and Ginsburg, found that Congress
had authorized the President’s order to detain enemy combatants such
as Hamdi, thus obviating the need to broach the separation of powers
question.121
Whereas the Government had not publicly revealed the exact set of
criteria it uses to classify someone as an enemy combatant,122 Hamdi
fell within established criteria under national and international law.
According to these criteria the Government can capture and detain an
individual who is “part of or supporting forces hostile to the United
States or coalition partners” that are “engaged in an armed conflict
against the United States.”123 The detention of such an individual is to
118
119
120
121

Id.
Id. at 511-12.
Id. at 519-21.
As will be discussed infra notes 162-163 and accompanying text, Justices Souter and
Ginsburg concluded both that congressional authorization was required and that in cases such as
Hamdi’s it was not granted.
122 See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 516.
123 Id.
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be for security purposes, not for punishment, to prevent him or her from
rejoining the enemy’s forces after being released. Such detention,
moreover, cannot last beyond the end of hostilities. Finally, relying on
the precedent set in Ex parte Quirin,124 the plurality held that American
citizenship is no bar to being designated an enemy combatant.125 The
plurality went on to acknowledge, however, that dealing with enemy
combatant designations in the war on terror would raise thorny
problems as the enemy may not be visible or clearly defined and as the
end of such war may be elusive and unlikely to be marked by a clear cut
event, such as a formal cease-fire agreement.126 Nevertheless, these
difficulties did not affect Hamdi’s case, as conventional military
hostilities were taking place in late 2001 in Afghanistan when Hamdi
was captured, and as such armed conflict between the United States and
the Taliban was still occurring in Afghanistan in 2004 at the time the
case was heard by the Court.127
The bulk of the plurality’s analysis was devoted to Hamdi’s
challenge to his designation as an enemy combatant. The only evidence
the Government introduced in the courts in support of its contention that
Hamdi was properly being detained as an enemy combatant was the
declaration of Michael Mobbs (the Mobbs Declaration), an officer of
the Defense Department who had reviewed relevant documentation and
was familiar with military policy and procedure relating to designation
as an enemy combatant, but who had no firsthand information
concerning Hamdi’s capture by the Northern Alliance, his being turned
over to the United States military, or the evidence the military had
considered in concluding that Hamdi was an enemy combatant.128
The Government’s position before the Court was that the Mobbs
Declaration was all the evidence that Hamdi was entitled to; for, as
noted above,129 the Government insisted that the courts were limited to
the determination of whether Hamdi’s detention was within the
authority of the Executive Branch. For that purpose, the Government
argued it was sufficient that it present “some evidence,” and the Mobbs
Declaration satisfied that requirement.130 Consistent with this argument,
124
125
126
127

317 U.S. 1 (1942).
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 519.
Id. at 520.
Id. at 521. Contrast the circumstances surrounding the detention of another American
citizen, Jose Padilla, upon his arrival in a commercial airplane in Chicago from a trip to Pakistan.
See Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 524 U.S. 426, 426 (2004). Determining whether Padilla was properly
designated as an “enemy combatant” would have necessitated dealing with the difficult questions
left open in Hamdi. By disposing of the case on procedural grounds, the Court avoided dealing
with these questions. See id. at 426.
128 See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 512-13.
129 See supra note 91.
130 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 526.
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the courts would have been limited to determining from the face of the
Mobbs Declaration whether Hamdi’s detention was consistent with the
Executive Branch’s authority to detain enemy combatants. This
determination, however, would have to have been made without regard
to the veracity of the Mobbs Declaration or to the weight of the
evidence on which it purported to rely. Accordingly, the judiciary
would have been limited to a determination, based solely on a
declaration made by the Government, of whether the asserted
Government authority falls within the legitimate realm of authority of
the Executive Branch. Under these circumstances, virtually complete
executive unilateralism would prevail.
Hamdi, on the other hand, wanted a full judicial hearing in
compliance with constitutional safeguards and the law of evidence to
determine whether he was properly designated as an enemy
combatant.131 Had Hamdi been charged with a criminal offense, he
would have been entitled to the full panoply of constitutional
protections afforded criminal defendants and to the Government’s
having to prove the charges against him beyond a reasonable doubt.
Hamdi, however, though facing possible lifetime detention because of
the conceivably unending nature of the war on terror, was being
detained not as a criminal, but for interrogation and security purposes.
As the Court’s plurality emphasized, Congress contemplated that habeas
corpus petitioners would have an opportunity to present facts and rebut
facts introduced against them.132 Moreover, the plurality specified that
it was up to the courts to adjust the ways in which the due process
requirements associated with habeas petitions may be handled
depending on the particular context of the challenged detention.133
Rejecting executive unilateralism and a purely process-based
approach,134 the plurality declared that resolution of the conflict over
what process was due to Hamdi had to be achieved on the basis of
“constitutional balancing.”135 What had to be balanced, moreover, was
Hamdi’s procedural due process right not to be deprived of his liberty
without notice and an opportunity to be heard, on the one hand, and the
Government’s compelling interest in waging the war in Afghanistan in
the most efficient way possible with the least possible danger to U.S.
troops and (because the war in Afghanistan is part of the war on terror
131
132
133
134

Id. at 524-25.
Id. at 526.
Id.
Rejection of a purely institutional process-based approach stems from the plurality’s
refusal to accept the Government’s position, although the plurality concluded that detention of
enemy combatants in connection with the war in Afghanistan had been authorized by the
Congress. See id. at 516-17.
135 Id. at 532.
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and the Taliban is linked to Al Qaeda) to U.S. civilians at home and
abroad, on the other hand.
Such constitutional balancing is quite customary in judicial
determinations of the limits of substantive constitutional rights, but
quite problematic when used to specify procedural rights in cases such
as Hamdi’s. For example, free-speech rights do not extend to utterances
that incite to violence.136 This means that the state’s interest in
protecting those who are likely to become victims of violence as a
consequence of inflammatory utterances that urge aggression against
them clearly outweighs whatever communicative benefit may flow from
the inciting utterance. Accordingly, the balancing involved sets the
limits of the substantive rights at stake. In contrast, in at least certain
settings, such as criminal prosecutions of serious crimes that may result
in long prison terms, the confines of the applicable procedural rights
cannot fluctuate depending on the circumstances of the crime at stake.
For example, the criminal trial of a person accused of being a serial
killer cannot be conducted with fewer procedural safeguards than the
trial of someone accused of a white collar crime who poses no danger of
violence whatsoever. The Constitution guarantees the same procedural
rights to all accused of having committed a serious crime; this is
appropriate because they all have an equal stake in determination of
innocence or guilt. The presumed serial killer has the same interest as
the presumed white collar criminal in being allowed to use the full
panoply of available procedural safeguards in connection with the
determination of his or her guilt.
Hamdi was neither accused of a crime nor subjected to a criminal
proceeding, but his detention, which the plurality acknowledged could
potentially have lasted throughout his entire lifetime,137 was comparable
to that of a convicted criminal’s sentenced to a long prison term. The
determinative issue in Hamdi is not whether the security interests of the
United States far outweigh the liberty interests of enemy combatants,
but whether or not Hamdi was an enemy combatant. And, with respect
to this latter issue, while there may be no need to adhere to the
formalities of a criminal trial, it is difficult to understand why Hamdi
should not have been entitled to procedural safeguards that are as
efficacious and as fair as those afforded criminal defendants.
Balancing in the context of procedural due process rights is
certainly warranted in many civil cases in which the threatened
deprivation of liberty or property is relatively minor. Whereas
temporary suspension of a state granted license or denial of a state
permit resulting in a loss of business must comply with the due process
136
137

See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-48 (1969).
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 520.
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requirements of notice and an opportunity to be heard, it is clear that
insisting on the formalities of a criminal trial in such cases would be
completely disproportionate.138
To determine what process is due to comply with due process
under given circumstances, the courts resort to judicial balancing
consistent with the criteria set in Mathews v. Eldridge,139 a case
involving termination of disability benefits. The test articulated in
Mathews and implemented by the plurality in Hamdi requires weighing
the private interest affected by state action against the Government’s
asserted interest, taking into proper account the added burden the
Government would have to assume were it to afford greater process.140
More specifically, what the judicial balancing test must address is “the
risk of an erroneous deprivation” of the private interest affected if the
process were reduced against the “probable value, if any, of additional
or substitute safeguards.”141
The plurality recognized that Hamdi’s interest in being free from
physical detention by the Government is “the most elemental of liberty
interests”142 and that the danger of erroneous deprivation of liberty in
the absence of sufficient process is very high.143 In particular, the
plurality noted that the danger of mistaken military detention of
journalists and humanitarian relief workers in a war such as that fought
in Afghanistan is quite high.144 On the other hand, the military’s need
to detain captured enemy combatants to prevent their return to the
theater of war to fight alongside the enemy is compelling, as is the
freedom to pursue strategic military objectives with utmost
flexibility.145 Equally paramount is that the military not get bogged
down with trial-like processes that would distract them from their
military mission and might compromise military secrets by making
them subject to discovery.146
Under these circumstances, the plurality found that neither the
criminal-trial-like process proposed by Hamdi nor the Mobbs
Declaration offered by the government struck the proper balance.147
138 Cf. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546 (1985) (holding that tenured
public employee facing dismissal was entitled to a pre-termination notice, oral or written, of
charges, an explanation of employer’s evidence, and an opportunity to present his side of the
story).
139 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
140 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 529 (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335).
141 Id. (quoting Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335).
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 Id. at 530 (citing Brief for AmeriCares et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner).
145 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 531.
146 Id. at 531-32.
147 Id. at 532-33.
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The former would be too burdensome on the military; the latter would
not allow a meaningful challenge to an erroneous detention.
The proper balance, according to the plurality, required that a
citizen detained as an enemy combatant be given notice of the factual
basis for such detention and be entitled to rebut the Government’s
factual assertion before a neutral decision-maker.148 To alleviate the
burden on the Government while the Executive is engaged in active
military operations, the plurality specified that hearsay evidence is
acceptable, and that once the Government made out a prima facie case
for detention, it would be appropriate to grant the Government’s
evidence a presumption of validity:149 the burden of persuasion would
then shift to the detainee to rebut that presumption and to demonstrate
that he or she does not fall within the relevant criteria.150 This burden
shifting procedure would ensure, in the plurality’s estimation, that “the
errant tourist, embedded journalist, or local aid worker has a chance to
prove military error.”151
The “balance” struck by the plurality imposes little additional
burden on the Government, and it may be adequate for an erroneously
detained journalist, but not for someone in a predicament such as
Hamdi’s. The Government’s initial burden would be satisfied by a
Mobbs Declaration, but the shifting of the burden of proof would make
it very difficult and burdensome to overcome the Mobbs Declaration’s
presumption of validity. It is well known that the determination of
which party bears the burden of proof is often decisive in litigation.152
In the case of a journalist, bearing the burden of proof may not amount
to an insurmountable obstacle if the detainee is employed by a large
news organization that can vouch for the journalist’s employment and
for his or her assignment to cover the war. But what if someone like
Hamdi had been turned over to the Northern Alliance by local Afghan
villagers who acted to receive a ransom? It would presumably be
impossible to meet the burden of proof, and the detainee’s fate would be
sealed as a practical matter by the Mobbs Declaration.
As bad as the plurality balancing was for Hamdi, it is even worse
for someone like Jose Padilla, a United States citizen arrested on
American soil upon suspicion of involvement in a terrorist plot to carry
out an attack within the United States with a nuclear weapon, a socalled dirty bomb.153 Hamdi was captured in Afghanistan in a theater of
148
149
150
151
152
153

Id. at 533.
Id. at 533-34.
Id. at 534.
Id.
See, e.g., Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 551 (1965).
See Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004). After continued detention without charges
after the refiling of his case in the lower courts, in November 2005, the Justice Department
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war, and though to be sure very difficult, it would not have necessarily
been impossible for him to obtain the testimony of people he dealt with
in Afghanistan that might have helped him meet his burden of proof
were he in fact the relief worker that his father claimed.154 In a case
such as Padilla’s, in contrast, the Government’s Mobbs Declaration may
simply consist of a statement that a reliable undercover intelligence
operation has gathered convincing evidence that the detainee is involved
in an ongoing terrorist plot to plant a dirty bomb in some unknown
location in the United States at some unknown time in the future. The
government could plausibly claim, moreover, that revealing the source
of the information contained in the Mobbs Declaration would
compromise national security and seriously derail the Executive’s
conduct of the war on terror. Under such circumstances, it would seem
nearly impossible for Padilla, or for most other American citizens for
that matter, to meet the requisite burden in order to overcome the
presumption of validity accorded to the Government.
In the last analysis, whereas the plurality rejected Executive
unilateralism, when one considers where the balance was struck, the
departure from unilateralism was limited. Furthermore, from the
standpoint of judicial balancing itself, the plurality accorded too little
weight to the serious deprivation of liberty associated with the
designation as an enemy combatant and too much weight to security
concerns relating to the war on terrorism. The plurality’s handling of
balancing in Hamdi thus raises the question of whether it would be
better to use a categorical approach in enemy combatant cases.
Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion in Hamdi does offer a
categorical solution to the conflict between the government and Hamdi.
According to Justice Scalia, the Government could only continue to
detain Hamdi indefinitely without pressing charges against him if
Congress were to suspend the right to habeas corpus, which it can only
do in case of an invasion or rebellion.155 Otherwise, the Government
could either press charges against Hamdi or release him, as the
Constitution would then require that his habeas petition be granted.156
indicted Padilla as a minor figure in a conspiracy to support radical Islamic fighters in
Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya and elsewhere. See Neil A. Lewis, Indictment Portrays Padilla
As Minor Figure in a Plot, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2005, at A27. He was since transferred from
military custody to civilian custody and has pled not guilty to the charges. See Terry Aguayo,
Padilla Pleads Not Guilty; Bail is Denied, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2006, at A14. The government’s
request to transfer custody was granted by the Supreme Court after the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit refused. See Hanft v. Padilla, 126 S.Ct. 978 (2006).
154 See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
155 See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 562. Congress would have to decide whether the September 11,
2001 attacks constituted an “invasion” and whether these attacks still justified suspension several
years later. Id. at 578.
156 Id. at 576-78.
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Justice Scalia further stressed that there were several criminal laws
already enacted by Congress that the Executive could invoke to press
charges against someone like Hamdi, including laws against treason,
against providing material support to terrorists, and against “enlistment
to serve in armed hostility against the United States.”157 Significantly,
the only American citizen other than Hamdi detained after capture in the
Afghan theater of war, John Lindh, had already been criminally charged
and convicted.158
Unlike Lindh, who fell into American hands and who pled guilty to
criminal charges,159 Hamdi may well have been difficult to convict.
Indeed, given that he was captured by the Northern Alliance, the
Government may have felt that it lacked a sufficiently solid case to meet
the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.160
Justice Scalia’s categorical approach could be even more
problematic for the Government in cases such as Padilla’s. Suppose, for
example, that American undercover intelligence officials working with
foreign counterparts had come upon solid evidence of a detainee’s
participation in a conspiracy to plant a dirty bomb at a specified location
within the United States. Suppose further that the evidence in the
Government’s possession would suffice to prove the detainee’s active
involvement in the above conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt. The
Government, however, may not be in a position to prosecute the
detainee without compromising vital intelligence sources and methods.
Under such circumstances, under the categorical approach, the
Government would seem to have little choice but to release the detainee
after a relatively brief period of detention.
Some of the difficulties noted above with respect to the balancing
approach or the categorical approach may be better met by the processbased institutional approach. As already mentioned, the plurality
opinion in Hamdi placed some reliance on the process-based
approach,161 though that reliance was rather perfunctory. The opinion
of Justice Souter, concurring in part and dissenting in part, however,
makes much more vigorous use of the process-based approach.
Drawing on the Constitution’s reliance on “checks and balances,” and
referring to the permanent tension between security and liberty, Justice
Souter stressed that in time of war, Congress is in a better position than
the Executive to strike the right balance. In his view, the task of
157
158
159
160

Id. at 561.
Id.
Id.
Significantly, a few months after the Supreme Court decision, Yasser Hamdi was released
and sent back to Saudi Arabia. See ‘Enemy Combatant’ Sees Freedom, CBSNEWS.COM, Oct. 11,
2004, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/09/27/national/main645822.shtml.
161 See supra notes 134-135 and accompanying text.
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balancing is not well entrusted to the Executive Branch of Government,
whose responsibility is to maintain security. For reasons of inescapable
human nature, the branch of the Government asked to counter a serious
threat is not the branch on which to rest the nation’s entire reliance in
striking the balance between the will to win and the cost in liberty on
the way to victory; the responsibility for security will naturally amplify
the claim that security legitimately raises.162 In other words, because
Congress is less likely to be biased in favor of security, it is better suited
to strike the right balance and thus check any Executive propensity to
disproportionately favor security.163
The process-based approach envisioned by Justice Souter provides
a preferable and presumably more reliable alternative to executive
unilateralism and, at least in those cases in which statutory law falls on
the side of liberty, to ad-hoc judicial balancing.164 On the other hand,
the process-based approach lacks the flexibility of its two alternatives.
Indeed, neither the broad post-9/11 congressional authorization nor the
more restrictive Non-Detention Act was drafted with the peculiarities of
the war in Afghanistan or the capture of individuals such as Hamdi and
Padilla in mind.165
Another important factor further complicates the task of striking a
proper balance between security and liberty in cases such as Hamdi’s,
Padilla’s, and those of the Guantanamo detainees. That factor is that the
war on terror is fought at once as a conventional military war and as a
national and international operation designed to bring criminals to
justice.166 Indeed, the military campaign conducted by the United States
and its allies against the Taliban in Afghanistan was regarded by the
Bush Administration as a war against a state army.167 At the same time,
162
163

Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 535-37.
Unlike the plurality, Justice Souter did not rely on the broadly phased congressional
authorization allowing the President to “use all necessary and appropriate force against those
nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the
terrorist attacks” to assess the legality of indefinite detention of enemy combatants. See Hamdi,
542 U.S. at 51 (citing Authorization for Use of Military Force, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (codified as
amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2002))). This authorization adopted shortly after the September
11, 2001, attacks did not refer to detentions and thus, in Justice Souter’s view, it was neither
consistent with, nor did it supersede, the Non-Detention Act, which provides that “[n]o citizen
shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained by the United States except pursuant to an Act of
Congress.” See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 542.
164 As mentioned in the discussion of the plurality opinion, see supra notes 120-155 and
accompanying text, where there is Congressional authorization for a detention, absent suspension
of habeas corpus, such detention can still be challenged in the courts as being violative of the
detainee’s constitutional rights.
165 See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 542 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
166 See supra note 37.
167 See Bush: Geneva Treaty Applies to Taliban Detainees, CNN.COM, Feb. 7, 2002,
http://archives.cnn.com/2002/US/02/07/ret.bush.detainees/. Although President Bush specified
that the Taliban had not been recognized by the United States as the legitimate government of
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the President made clear that Al Qaeda members and other terrorists
would not be treated as fighters and that he would not afford them rights
under the Geneva Conventions.168 The problem caused by this
bifurcated approach without clear lines of demarcation was that issues
relating to those designated as enemy combatants did not fit neatly
within either of the two well-defined distinct legal paradigms. In cases
of conventional war, captured enemy soldiers are to be subjected to the
categorical prescriptions of the Geneva Conventions and of other
relevant bodies of international law and detained until the end of
hostilities in accordance with the requirements that these laws
impose.169 In contrast, criminal suspects must be charged with a crime
or released from detention within a relatively short time.170 Also, if
charged they must be afforded the full set of constitutionally guaranteed
procedural protections regardless of the crime involved.171
In all three cases, the government attempted to straddle the line
between these two regimes in order not to fall within the strictures of
the criminal law system while also escaping from the requirements of
the Geneva Conventions. Neither the American citizens, Hamdi and
Padilla, nor those Guantanamo detainee plaintiffs in Rasul—who were
citizens of countries friendly to the United States, such as Australia and
Kuwait172—fell within the ordinary definition of enemy combatants.
Moreover, they all contested their designations as enemy combatants.
The government sought to avoid legal responsibility for the detentions
by seeking to carve out as best it could a no man’s land between the two
regimes.
Only the plurality in Hamdi sought to resolve this impasse by
means of a balancing approach. Four of the remaining five justices
found Hamdi’s indefinite detention illegal.173 On the other hand, both
Padilla and Rasul left the balancing question open. In the end, both the
need for balancing and the kind of balancing needed depend on which
legal regime is properly brought to bear on these cases. And, neither of
the two familiar paradigms, that of criminal law or that of the law of
war, seems adequate.

Afghanistan, he declared that he would apply the Geneva Conventions to Taliban fighters.
168 Id.
169 See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 118, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
170 See Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion in Hamdi. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 554-58 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
171 See supra note 37.
172 Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 470-71 (2004).
173 These were Justices Scalia, Stevens, Souter and Ginsburg. See supra notes 155-164 and
accompanying text. Justice Thomas in his dissent agreed with the government’s position. See
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 554-58 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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III. BALANCING, PROPORTIONALITY, AND THE ISRAELI DECISIONS
Not only is the Israeli Court’s balancing as broad as the American
Court’s is narrow,174 but the Israeli cases are much more directly related
to an ongoing war than their American counterparts.175 Whereas the
American cases dealt with procedural rights of detainees far removed
from theaters of war, the Israeli cases concerned substantive rights
pressed by civilian non-combatants affected by ongoing military
activity, including active combat within the very core of the relevant
theater of war.176 Moreover, whereas in the United States balancing did
not result in a dramatic departure from the Government’s position, in
Israel, balancing led the Court to order the Government to make
substantial changes to the location of the separation barrier built for
security and to make changes in the conduct of an ongoing military
operation in Gaza.177
If, from the standpoint of security, the circumstances surrounding
the Israeli cases seem much less amenable to balancing than their
American counterparts, from the standpoint of the respective rights
involved, the opposite appears to be true. The Israeli cases involve
substantive liberty, property, and dignity rights—which are usually
subjected to judicial balancing.178 These rights are customarily not
absolute, and their limits are usually established through judicial
balancing or proportionality-based analysis. As already mentioned, the
relative weight ascribed to the particular rights and government interests
involved may vary from context to context or among various
jurisdictions, and so may the proportion by which a government interest
must outweigh a right to justify limitation or derogation, but the
determination always involves some kind of judicial balancing.179
The Israeli cases relate to military action claimed to be necessary
for the security of the country and for the safety of its citizens. At the
same time, these military undertakings adversely affected the legitimate
and recognized liberty, property, and dignity interests of Palestinian
civilians residing in the occupied territory areas affected. In a
constitutional democracy, the military has an obligation—enhanced in
Israel by the legal responsibilities imposed by the international laws of
174
175
176

See supra, p. 2105.
See supra, p. 2106.
See Mara’abe, supra note 68 (separation fence erected to thwart would be suicide bombers
coming from West Bank); Beit Sourik, supra note 1 (same); see also Physicians for Human
Rights, supra note 1 (military operation, including hostile combat in Gaza).
177 See infra notes 190, 214, 217, 228-232 and accompanying text.
178 See supra p. 2117.
179 See supra Part I.C.
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belligerent occupation applicable to the West Bank and Gaza180—to
take into account, and to ascribe proper weight, to the needs, legitimate
interests, rights, and liberties of the civilians who will be inevitably
adversely affected by implementation of military policy.181 Beyond
that, however, should ongoing military operations be subjected to
judicial balancing? And if they are, are judges competent to perform
the requisite balancing operations?
The Israeli decisions rest on a seeming paradox. As Chief Justice
Barak starkly stated in Beit Sourik, “We, Justices of the Supreme Court
are not experts in military affairs.”182 Yet, he also hastened to add that
his Court is competent to review the Israeli military commander’s
decision concerning the location of the barrier because judges are the
experts in applying the principle of proportionality.183 This sense of
paradox is heightened, moreover, by the Court’s refusal to enter into the
battle among military experts. The Palestinian plaintiffs whose land
was seized, mobility curtailed, and communal life disrupted, were
joined by the Council for Peace and Security (Council), an Israeli
nongovernmental organization that included high ranking reserve
officers of the IDF and that had expertise in military security.184 The
Council joined the Palestinian plaintiffs as amici curiae185 and argued
that in their expert opinion, better security for Israel and less intrusive
incursion into Palestinian lands and community life could be achieved
by moving the barrier closer to Israel.186 The defendant, the IDF’s
military commander in the West Bank, acknowledged the expertise of
the Council but disagreed with their judgment, insisting that the actual
location for the barrier decided upon by the IDF was the optimal
security option after giving proper weight to political considerations and
to the legitimate interests of Palestinian civilians.187 Faced with this
disagreement among experts, the Court recognized that the conflicting
positions involved were “based upon contradictory military views,”188
but went on to declare “we must grant special weight to the military
opinion of the official who is responsible for security.”189 Yet, for all its
180
181

See Beit Sourik, supra note 1, para. 23.
Id. at para. 13 (discussing the military’s assertion than in planning the separation barrier
“great weight was given” to the interests of Palestinians affected).
182 Id. at para. 46.
183 Id. at para. 48.
184 Id. at para. 16.
185 Id. at para. 18.
186 Id. at paras. 18-19.
187 Id. at para. 20.
188 Id. at para. 47.
189 Id. While the court refused to weigh the respective strengths and weakness of the two
contending military positions, it did indicate that the military commander’s position was not
beyond challenge. The commander was entitled to a presumption that his “professional reasons
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unwillingness to enter the battle of the military experts, the Court
engaged in a weighing of the tradeoffs between security and liberty
struck by the barrier, and concluded that the IDF had acted in a
disproportionate manner.190 Furthermore, based on that conclusion, the
Court ordered the military commander to come up with changes
regarding the barrier in order to ensure compliance with the
requirements of proportionality.191
The Court asserted that military affairs are no different than any of
the other areas beyond its expertise in relation to which it is called upon
to adjudicate controversies by means of judicial balancing.192 Close
examination of what the Court does rather than what it says it does,
however, leads to a much more nuanced conclusion. Military affairs are
in some respects like other specialized fields, but in other respects, they
appear sui generis. Before evaluating this conclusion in greater detail
and assessing how it affects the legitimacy and efficacy of judicial
balancing in cases dealing with military affairs, it is necessary to take a
closer look at the Israeli Court’s handling of the cases before it.
The Court’s recourse to balancing and proportionality analysis in
its adjudication of the controversy over the separation barrier is
grounded both in the relevant application of substantive law and in the
Court’s established practice of using balancing to resolve conflicts
between competing interests. From the standpoint of substantive law,
the international law of belligerent occupation allows the occupying
country to protect its security and that of its citizens, but also requires
that country to balance its security needs against the rights, needs, and
interests of the population residing in the occupied territory.193 More
generally, proportionality is a key principle of the law of war, which
requires establishing a balance between “military needs and
humanitarian considerations.”194 Proportionality is also a general
principle of Israeli administrative law and has more recently become a
constitutional principle incorporated in Article 8 of Israel’s Basic Law
on human dignity and freedom.195
As already mentioned, the IDF, which is an administrative body
under Israeli law, had performed its substantive legal obligation to
balance security concerns against the rights and interests of affected

are sincere reasons.” Id.
evidence.” Id.
190 Id. at paras. 60-62.
191 Id. at para. 86.
192 Id. at para. 46.
193 Id. at para. 34.
194 Id. at para. 37.
195 Id. at para. 38.

This presumption can only be overcome by “very convincing
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Palestinians before settling on the location of the barrier.196 In this
respect, the IDF’s administrative duty is equivalent to the constitutional
duty of the U.S. Executive.197 Unlike the American Court however, the
Israeli Court was engaging in administrative review and, accordingly,
its first task was to determine whether the military commander had
performed his balancing duty in good faith. The Court found that he
had.198
The Court’s exercise in judicial balancing started after this initial
determination, thus raising the question of the extent to which it merely
supplements the non-judicial balancing performed by the military
commander as opposed to engaging in a de novo balancing of its own.
To elucidate this question, it is first necessary to inquire briefly into the
proportionality test used by the Court.
The proportionality test used by the Court, applicable under both
international law and Israeli administrative law, is divided into three
subtests.199 The first subtest requires that the administrative means used
be rationally related to the realization of the state’s objective.200 The
second subtest prescribes that the means used to realize the objective be
those that are “least injurious” to adversely affected individuals.201
Finally, the third subtest, that of “proportionality in the narrow sense,”
requires that the harm to the relevant individuals be proportionate to the
benefit to the state.202 The third subtest can be satisfied in one of two
possible ways: either by directly weighing the benefits against the
harms of the proposed administrative course of action; or, by comparing
different administrative alternatives to one another to determine whether
the decrease in benefit caused by shifting from the most beneficial
alternative to a somewhat less beneficial one is accompanied by a
greater decrease in harm. If it is, then proportionality requires that the
somewhat less beneficial but significantly less harmful alternative be
adopted.203
All three subtests require balancing, albeit different kinds of
balancing. The rationality requirement of the first subtest calls for
minimal balancing in that only such means that are so disproportionate
as to be irrational are excluded.204 The second subtest requires a
196
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See supra note 181.
See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
Beit Sourik, supra note 1, at para. 85.
Id. at para. 40.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Minimal “rationality” analysis does not, strictly speaking, always require balancing.
Whether or not it does depends on whether the relevant means are “irrational” because grossly
disproportionate, or “irrational” because illogical, contradictory, or inherently absurd. For
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balancing among the respective injuries that would result from adoption
of the various possible means toward the relevant administrative
objective. This requires applying a proportionality standard that
includes comparison and may involve “balancing” in a pure formal
sense, as when one alternative calling for the expropriation of one
hundred landowners is “weighed” against another alternative involving
only fifty such expropriations. On the other hand, more problematic
balancing would become necessary if one alternative involved land
expropriations and the other restrictions on the affected population’s
freedom of movement.205
Finally, the third subtest, that of
proportionality proper, requires extensive balancing, either between
military benefits and civilian harms, or between the ratios of harm to
benefit for various plausible alternatives.
Notwithstanding the Court’s declarations to the contrary, the
military dispute between the Council and the military commander
concerning which of their proposed routes for the barrier would be best
for security206 did figure prominently in the Court’s application of the
three-part proportionality test. The dispute centered on whether the
barrier would make Israel more secure if built away from Israel’s
population or if built away from the Palestinian population. The
Council maintained that a barrier close to Israel’s population would be
more easily defended as it would provide time and space to intercept
terrorists before they could harm Israeli soldiers or civilians.207
The military commander’s view, on the other hand, was that a
barrier closer to the Palestinian population would be safer for Israeli
soldiers and would give the latter a better opportunity to run down or
capture terrorists before they could reach Israeli civilians.208
Furthermore, the military commander and the Council agreed that a
example, increasing the speed limit on highways from 65 to 130 miles per hour for purposes of
improving highway safety, when statistics undisputedly demonstrate that the number of deaths on
the highway increase dramatically when cars travel at higher speeds, would be illogical and
contradictory. In contrast, prohibiting driving by all persons under twenty-five because of
evidence that those in that age group cause twice as many fatal automobile accidents as older
drivers—though ninety percent of those under twenty-five drive as safely as their older
counterparts—would not be illogical, as it would lead to an increase in safety on the highways.
Nevertheless, such a total ban would be so disproportionate as to be “irrational.”
205 In the Mara’abe case, the Court held that the segment of the separation fence in dispute
violated the second subtest because of the Israeli government’s failure to consider a prima facie
plausibly less injurious alternative route for reasons of political expediency. See Mara’abe, supra
note 68, paras. 113-14. The actual segment of the separation fence encompassed certain
Palestinian villages, placing them on the Israeli side of the barrier and cutting them off from the
West Bank. The plausible alternative location for the fence would leave the affected village on
the Palestinian side but was opposed by an Israeli community that feared an adverse effect on its
quality of life.
206 See supra notes 184-191 and accompanying text.
207 Beit Sourik, supra note 1, para. 18.
208 Id. at para. 20.
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barrier closer to the Palestinian population would be more injurious to
that population than one right next to the Israeli population,209 and also,
according to the Council, a closer barrier would further embitter the
Palestinians and thus eventually foment greater terrorism.210
The dispute between military experts had a significant bearing on
the Court’s application of the third subtest under the proportionality
standard. The Court resorted to the second alternative, namely,
comparing different plans for the location of the barrier with respect to
the ratio of harm to benefit that each of these plans would produce.
Accordingly, the Court did not engage in a direct weighing of harms
and benefits of the IDF plan, but it did take into account the plan
proposed by the Council for purposes of weighing the IDF plan against
plausible alternatives.211 This comparison between the two plans,
moreover, appears to contradict the Court’s assertion that it would
refuse to opine on the relative merits of various military options.
The Court sought to avoid this contradiction by arguing that the
comparison carried out in the course of conducting the third subtest was
not meant to be a comparison of military options. Instead, it was a
comparison necessitated by the Court’s duty to balance the IDF’s plan
regarding the barrier against plans with different ratios of harms to
benefits. As the Court saw it, it was not comparing military options to
determine which one was militarily best, but to determine whether the
IDF plan was on balance compatible with the humanitarian
considerations owed Palestinian civilians under Israeli and international
law.212 In other words, the military comparison was not for its own
sake, but merely subordinate to finding the proper balance between
security and liberty.
The specific finding of the Court was that even though it accepted
that the IDF plan led to greater security than the Council’s, the IDF plan
also led to much greater injury than the Council’s. Therefore,
concluded the Court, since the difference in security between the plans
was “minute,” the IDF plan failed the third subtest and had to be
rejected as disproportionate.213 Based on that conclusion, the Court
ordered the military commander to draw a new plan for the barrier, and
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Id. at paras. 18, 29.
Id. at para. 18.
Id. at para. 61.
Id. at para. 48.
Id. at para. 61. Cf. Mara’abe, supra note 68, para. 116. If the plausible alternative
mentioned supra note 205 does not prove viable, then without the disputed segment “there is no
security for the Israelis,” and with it “there is a severe injury to the fabric of life of the residents
of the [Palestinian] villages.” Applying subtest three under such circumstances will be “the most
difficult of the questions.” Id.

2006]

JUDICIAL BALANCING

2125

specified that one possible, though by no means required, alternative
was adoption of the Council’s plan.214
In the end, the Court did not engage in a direct comparison of
military plans, but it did perform an indirect comparison. The Court did
not order the military commander to adopt the Council’s plan, but it did
order him to adopt something comparable. Finally, the Court struck
down the IDF’s plan not because it did not strike a proper military
balance between security and liberty, but because it failed to strike that
very same balance as required by humanitarian considerations.
From a substantive point of view, the balancing engaged in by the
Court in Beit Sourik is certainly de novo balancing rather than a review
of the adequacy of an administrative agency’s balancing. The Israeli
Court’s balancing seems to be the equivalent of the kind of balancing
that courts routinely perform in ordinary civilian settings.215 This
squarely raises the question of whether different criteria concerning
balancing should apply in the context of military affairs than in that of
civilian ones. This question will be examined in Part V below, but brief
reference must be made here to the Physicians for Human Rights
decision, in which the Israeli Court went even further than it did in Beit
Sourik, and in its own words, was “at the outer limits of the reach of the
judiciary”216 when it used judicial balancing with respect to military
actions that included ongoing armed combat with the enemy.217
Physicians for Human Rights arose out of an Israeli military
operation in the area of Rafah in the Gaza strip.218 The IDF mission
was to locate underground tunnels believed to be used to smuggle
weapons from Egypt and to arrest persons wanted for terrorist
activity.219 The IDF engaged in armed combat, exchanged gunfire and
was targeted with explosive charges during the course of the
operation.220

214
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Beit Sourik, supra note 1, para. 71.
One area in which courts are routinely called upon to balance conflicting claims is the
Dormant Commerce Clause under the American Constitution. The relevant principle, under the
Dormant Commerce Clause, is that where Congress has not regulated an area of interstate
commerce, state regulation that is not discriminatory against out of state business is constitutional
so long as the benefits it produces outweigh the burdens that the regulation in question imposes
on interstate commerce. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970). Thus, for
example, courts are called upon to determine whether the benefits produced by particular safety,
health or environmental regulations outweigh the burdens they impose on the free flow of
interstate commerce. See, e.g., S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S.761 (1945) (weighing safety of
shorter trains versus extra costs of uncoupling and reconstituting long trains at state borders).
216 Physicians for Human Rights, supra note 1, para. 9.
217 Id.
218 Id. at para. 1.
219 Id.
220 Id.
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The lawsuit was brought by human rights organizations prompted
by the harm caused to Palestinian civilians in Rafah by the military
operations, including demolition of houses and civilian injuries.221 The
plaintiffs requested that the Court order the IDF to allow medical teams
and ambulances to reach the wounded in Rafah;222 that electricity and
water be restored;223 that provision of food and medicine to certain
neighborhoods be permitted; that medical teams of one of the plaintiff
organizations be allowed entry into Gaza in order to assess the situation
there;224 and that an investigation be ordered into the shelling of a crowd
of protesting civilians that resulted in several deaths.225
The key question in Physicians for Human Rights is how close to
actual military conduct courts may intervene without crossing the line
into the realm of pure military decisionmaking to be left to military
commanders. The Court relied on a balancing approach to handle this
question.226 Moreover, within the area that the Court carved out as
proper for it to intervene into, it also decided on a balancing
approach.227
Like in the Beit Sourik case, the Court in Physicians for Human
Rights emphasized that it did not question the wisdom of the decision to
engage in military action.228 Moreover, the Court specified that it
would refuse to take any position on how the IDF is carrying out armed
combat so long as soldiers’ lives are in danger.229 But when they are
not in danger, courts are empowered to review military decisions to
make sure they comply with applicable law.230 So long as soldiers’
lives are in danger, security issues relating to ongoing military
obligations outweigh liberty interests and humanitarian concerns.231
Beyond that, however, the security benefits of military action must be

221
222
223
224
225
226

Id. at para. 7.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at para. 77 (Beinisch, J., concurring) (speaking of “a new balance between . . . the fact
that the Court will not intervene in the combat activity itself, and between the need to ensure, at
the same time, that combat proceeds according to humanitarian obligations”).
227 Id. at para. 19 (stating that “the IDF must act . . . with reasonableness and proportionality”).
228 Id. at para. 17 (The Court “presume[s] that the operations in Rafah are necessary from a
military standpoint.”).
229 Id. at paras. 9-10.
230 Id. at para. 9.
231 Given the factual setting in Physicians for Human Rights, this latter assertion should be
qualified as follows: because the security involved outweighs the liberties in question, courts
should refuse to intervene prospectively. Given the Court’s insistence on the fact that, today,
wars are subject to law, id. at paras. 13-14, however, the relevant balancing should not be
construed as barring retrospective judicial intervention to punish unlawful war making.
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weighed against the harms that such action causes to liberty and dignity
interests.232
Consistent with the above distinctions, the Court divides the
military operations in Rafah into two categories: active combat and
maintaining order after such combat or during intervals between various
instances of such combat. In active combat, soldiers’ lives are highly at
risk, whereas in the course of maintaining order, they presumably are
much less so. In the war on terror, as made manifest in Gaza, however,
the distinction drawn between combat and maintaining order tends to
blur. For example, terrorists, such as members of Islamic Jihad, may
mix with civilians in a seemingly peaceful crowd233 and then attack
Israeli soldiers without warning. Should the Court nevertheless
continue to treat maintenance of order among civilians differently than
armed combat? Or do the particular ways of terrorism justify carving
out a much greater area of military discretion beyond judicial reach?
What is even more striking in Physicians for Human Rights is that
in addition to its intrusion on the military commander’s decisions, the
Court’s review of the latter’s decision and actions is contemporaneous
rather than ex post, bringing the Court in on every step of an ongoing
military mission. Such simultaneous intervention by the courts makes
fact gathering, dealing with constantly changing circumstances, and
evaluating contending assertions particularly difficult. As stated in the
concurring opinion, “the difficulty of employing judicial review as
combat continues reduces the effectiveness of that review and makes
intervention by the Court difficult.”234
In the end, the Israeli decisions leave unanswered the following
questions. First, is there any cogent way to draw or maintain the
distinction between zones of military discretion and zones where such
discretion ought to be balanced against humanitarian concerns?
Second, even if there were a cogent way to maintain the latter
distinction, is judicial intervention into day-to-day military operations
ever justified? And if not, is there any plausible alternative to
unmitigated military discretion in the face of an ongoing war on terror?
For all its insistence that it did not second guess military policy, the
Israeli Court came close in both Beit Sourik and Physicians for Human
Rights to engaging in complete de novo review. In the application of
the proportionality test “in the narrow sense,” the Court gave some
deference, but not much, to the military judgment of the relevant IDF
commander. In both cases, the Court ordered changes in military
actions and policies, and in the Physicians for Human Rights case, it
232
233
234

Id. at para. 11.
See id. at para. 56.
Id. at para. 77 (Beinisch, J., concurring).
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actually became an active participant in the ongoing military operation,
ordering commanders to make changes and adjustments in the midst of
an active military campaign. Did the Israeli Court go too far?
IV. BRITISH PROPORTIONALITY ANALYSIS AND THE DISTINCTION
BETWEEN TIMES OF CRISIS AND TIMES OF STRESS
Like in the American cases, the main issue in the A(FC) case
decided by the Law Lords was whether indefinite detention without
charges of persons suspected of having links to terrorism was
compatible with fundamental liberty and due process rights. As viewed
by the Law Lords, the answer to this question depended on one or both
of two key considerations: whether the war on terror as gauged from the
vantage point of the United Kingdom created a state of emergency or
merely conditions of stress; and, whether different treatment of the
detainees who were non-deportable foreigners as compared to that of
otherwise similarly situated deportable foreigners and British nationals
not subject to deportation violated applicable anti-discrimination
standards. Eight of the nine Law Lords found the challenged detentions
to be in violation of the ECHR and of the 1998 United Kingdom Human
Rights Act.235
In reaching their decision, the Law Lords applied a proportionality
standard to determine whether the war on terror created a state of
emergency:236 they balanced the detainees liberty interests against the
nation’s security interests,237 much as the plurality in Hamdi had, and
they considered whether the different treatment accorded foreign
suspected terrorists in comparison with domestic ones was
disproportionate.238 The eight Law Lords who found the challenged
detentions illegitimate diverged on the precise grounds for their
conclusions. There was disagreement over how much deference the
courts owed Parliament and the Executive,239 over whether the United
Kingdom’s war on terror was fought under emergency conditions or
conditions of stress,240 and over whether the challenged detentions were
235 Lord Walker of Gestingthrope was the lone dissenter. See A(FC) v. Sec’y of State of the
Home Dep’t [2004] UKHL 56, [2005] 2 A.C. 68, 166-67 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.).
236 See id. at 102-03.
237 Id. at 160.
238 Id. at 142, 144.
239 Compare Lord Bingham’s opinion deferring to the Executive on the question of whether,
on a factual basis, the terrorist threat justified the conclusion that the United Kingdom was in a
state of emergency, see id. at 102, with Lord Hoffman’s refusal to accord such deference and
conclusion that there was no such emergency, see id. at 131-32.
240 Contrast Lord Hoffman, see id. at 132 (concluding no emergency), with Lord Hope of
Craighead, see id. at 137-38 (finding the government “fully justified” in its position that “there

2006]

JUDICIAL BALANCING

2129

illegitimate because unduly discriminatory—the prevalent view—or
because there was no state of emergency—Lord Hoffman’s view.241
To better grasp the role of proportionality and balancing in the Law
Lords’ decision, it is first necessary to focus briefly on the key factual
and legal underpinnings of the case. After the 9/11 attacks, the British
Parliament adopted antiterrorist legislation that provides in relevant part
that “[a] suspected international terrorist may be detained” as someone
subject to deportation even if he or she cannot be deported due to some
legal or factual impediment.242 Consistent with this legislation, as
already mentioned,243 the United Kingdom deported certain foreign
suspected terrorists to their country of citizenship, but the United
Kingdom could not do so with respect to others whose deportation
would have been in violation of United Kingdom obligations under
international law because of the danger that the would-be deportees
would be tortured upon their return home. The latter challenged their
indefinite detention without charges—which resembled the challenge in
the American cases but was not equivalent in that the detainees in the
United Kingdom had always had access to administrative bodies and
courts for review of the legitimacy of their detention244—under the
ECHR incorporated into United Kingdom domestic law by the 1998
Human Rights Act.
The relevant provisions of the ECHR were: Article 5, which, as
mentioned, guarantees the “right to liberty and security of the person”
and provides basic due process rights to those under arrest;245 Article
14, which prohibits discrimination with respect to the rights secured by
the ECHR; and Article 15, which allows a country to derogate from its
obligations under the ECHR in times of emergency. Article 15.1
provides in relevant part: “In time of war or other public emergency
threatening the life of the nation any High Contracting Party may take
measures derogating from its obligations under this Convention to the
extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation . . . .”246
In November 2001, the United Kingdom derogated from its
obligations under the ECHR citing the September 11th attacks and the
subsequent U.N. Security Council resolutions recognizing those attacks
as a threat to world peace and security and referring to an existing threat
was an emergency threatening the life of the nation”).
241 Id. at 132.
242 See id. at 95 (citing Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001, c. 49, § 23(1) (Eng.));
see also A(FC), 2 A.C. at 91-92.
243 See supra pp. 2106-07.
244 See A(FC), 2 A.C. at 171.
245 See European Convention on Human Rights art. 5, §§ 2, 3, and 4, Nov. 4, 1950, 213
U.N.T.S. 221.
246 European Convention on Human Rights art. 15.1, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221
(emphasis added).
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posed by international terrorists against the United Kingdom in which
foreign nationals within its borders were playing a pivotal role.247
Within this framework, the key issues were: whether the threat of
international terrorism was proportionate so as to justify derogation;
whether, assuming it was, the means used to combat such terrorism
were the least restrictive possible with respect to the relevant liberty
(Art. 5) and equality (Art. 14) rights; and who, as between the political
branches and the courts, had the ultimate power to determine the
proportionality of derogation. Moreover, these inquiries had to be
placed in the context of an overall concern for striking a proper balance
between liberty and security in the United Kingdom’s war against
international terror.248
The standard for derogation, the existence of a state of crisis,249
was provided by the ECHR and hence, from a domestic standpoint, by
United Kingdom law itself.250 Furthermore, since derogation must be
affirmatively instituted by a country, the initial decision and, hence,
determination of the existence of a state of crisis in the first instance, is
the responsibility of the political branches. As mentioned above, the
Law Lords were divided over whether this determination by the
political branches was binding on the judiciary.251
The question of whether it is proper for judges to review the
proportionality of derogation, which involves deciding whether the
United Kingdom is actually in a state of crisis, parallels the question of
the propriety of judicial balancing in the American cases in significant
respects but with one major difference: under British law, the judiciary
can declare derogation or the means used to combat the crisis that
prompted derogation to be contrary to the Human Rights Acts, but it
cannot order relief or invalidate the challenged laws or executive
decrees. It remains up to Parliament to initiate changes or to remain
with the status quo notwithstanding the judicial declaration.252 As a
consequence, an erroneous assessment of the balance between liberty
and security by British judges seems less ominous than one by

247
248
249
250

See A(FC), 2 A.C. at 93-94.
See id. at 160.
See supra Part I.C.
This follows from incorporation of the ECHR through the 1998 Human Rights Act. See
supra text accompanying note 82.
251 See supra note 239.
252 See A(FC), 2 A.C. at 170. There is arguably another noteworthy difference between the
United States and the United Kingdom, given that the former is a presidential democracy while
the latter is a parliamentary democracy. Accordingly, the distinction between executive
unilateralism and an institutional process-based approach, which figures importantly in the U.S.
jurisprudence seems much less relevant in the United Kingdom. Given the focus of the Law
Lords’ opinions, this latter distinction need not be considered further for present purposes.
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American judges, since the British Parliament can ignore such an
assessment whereas the American political branches cannot.253
It is difficult to assess the import of the fact that the Law Lords
were divided over their power to review the propriety of derogation
given that they had a choice to conclude that the challenged detentions
were illegitimate because derogation was unjustified or because the
means employed in connection with it were disproportionate as
violative of the detainees’ ECHR equality rights. The question of the
propriety of judicial review of derogation decisions, though perhaps not
determinative in A(FC), is nonetheless of great importance as it could
well be determinative in other cases. For example, had the British
political branches decided to implement derogation through detention of
all suspected of having links with foreign terrorism regardless of
nationality or deportability, then there would have been no plausible
equality challenge. In that case, the legitimacy of the detentions would
turn on whether or not the United Kingdom would be facing conditions
of crisis.
This last possibility alone suggests the desirability of judicial
review of the initial decision leading to derogation. In the context of the
A(FC) case, moreover, there were three additional reasons that bolster
the conclusion that judicial review of the initial political decision was
desirable and that it could be performed in a principled way. The first
reason is that although the United Kingdom faced a similar threat from
international terrorism as other Western European nations, it was the
only country to have derogated from its obligations under the ECHR.254
Even Spain, after the attack perpetrated by Al Qaeda on March 11,
2004, in Madrid, did not derogate.255 Even if this fact alone should not
be determinative, and even if significant deference to political decisions
is warranted, perhaps by granting a rebuttable presumption of validity to
such decisions, the fact that the United Kingdom was the only one
among the forty-five members of the Council of Europe to derogate
from Article 5 of the ECHR raised a serious question at the time
concerning the conclusion that international terrorism was threatening
the life of the nation.256
The second reason is that the United Kingdom did have a period
within living memory during World War II in which the life of the
nation was definitely threatened, and as Lord Hoffman pointed out in

253 This is not to say that a decision by the Law Lords may not result in strong political
pressure on Parliament to conform the law to the judicial decision. Nonetheless, from an
institutional standpoint, Parliament remains free to ignore the judicial decision.
254 See A(FC), 2 A.C. at 99-101.
255 Id. at 100-01.
256 See supra notes 31, 246 and accompanying text.

2132

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27:5

the passage cited above,257 the current threat posed by international
terrorism is nothing comparable. The threat of international terrorism
does cause fear, and such fear may lead to exaggeration of the actual
dangers confronting the citizenry or of the probability that such dangers
will materialize.258 Precisely because of this, the circumstances
surrounding derogation should be closely scrutinized, and it seems
proper for judges to perform that function.259 As Lord Hoffman
observed, neither the United Kingdom, which had not experienced an
international terrorist attack at the time A(FC) was handed down, nor
Spain, which had conducted public affairs as if their institutions were
threatened or the life of the country was in peril.260 That alone should
suffice to lift the presumption of validity of the derogation.
The third reason that buttresses the case for judicial review is that
the means devised to deal with the threat that supposedly justified
derogation bolster security minimally if at all. This suggests that the
British political branches are not taking the terrorist threat as seriously
as they claim they are. To be sure, the mere adoption of discriminatory
means, even if they must be eventually invalidated because they
disproportionately trample on equality rights, does not necessary imply
that the threat sought to be contained is not taken with utmost
seriousness. For example, if the overwhelming majority of Al Qaeda
terrorists and their sympathizers happen to be Muslim, government
action targeting Muslims would be consistent with taking Al Qaeda’s
threats seriously, though disproportionate, from the standpoint of
equality rights. In contrast, the detention of non-deportable suspected
foreign international terrorists, but not of such suspected terrorists who
are British subjects, like Richard Reid, the “shoe bomber,” or of
deportable foreign suspects who may freely regroup and plan attacks on
the United Kingdom once back in their own country,261 seems highly
inconsistent.
The disproportionate means selected by the United Kingdom
provide an independent ground for a judicial finding that the challenged
detentions were illegitimate. As these means bordered on the
irrational,262 alternative means that treated all those suspected of having
links to international terrorism the same would not only have been more
equitable, but also in all likelihood more efficient and, hence, far more
257
258
259
260

See supra text accompanying note 31.
See A(FC), 2 A.C. at 136-37.
Id. at 137.
Id. at 130-31. Moreover, that concern is not altered by the July 2005 attacks. See Ralph
Frammolino, By Foot or by Bus, Londoners “Get On With It”, L.A. TIMES, July 23, 2005, at A9
(reporting on the resilience of London commuters after the attacks).
261 A(FC), 2 A.C. at 104-05.
262 Id. at 142.
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rational.263 Moreover, focus on the means rather than on the decision to
derogate arguably has the advantage of confining the judicial role to
what is clearly a matter of law as opposed to something that is above all
a matter of politics.264 The Law Lords who thought it inappropriate for
them to review the political decision to derogate, but entirely legitimate
for them to review the proportionality of means, thus took a position
very similar to that of the Israeli Supreme Court in the cases discussed
above.265 For the Israeli Court, the challenged military actions
themselves were not subject to judicial review, but their impact on
Palestinian civilians was.
In the A(FC) case, because the means were hardly rational, the
question of means could be kept clearly separate from that of
derogation. But what about a case in which the means are rational and
efficient though clearly discriminatory? In that situation, it would seem
that the British judiciary no more that the Israeli Court could neatly or
cogently sort out questions of law from questions of politics in the
course of proportionality review. Nevertheless, in the last analysis, it
seems less objectionable for judges to review the proportionality of a
political decision to derogate consistent with standards furnished by the
ECHR than for judges to review military action deployed in the course
of active engagement with the enemy.
There is an additional reason why judicial review of
proportionality of means with respect to equality is particularly
important in the context of the current war on terror. That war arises
out of an ideological conflict pitting proponents of certain forms of
radical Islamic fundamentalism against the values that prevail in
Western democracies. Under these circumstances, combating terrorism
by singling out Muslims, or foreigners who for the most part are
Muslims, seems particularly objectionable in as much as it encourages
casting Muslims as scapegoats to appease excessive fears stemming
from an overly susceptible public imagination. Moreover, not only
would such scapegoating unfairly trample on the fundamental liberties
of politically powerless minorities, but it may well also leave most of
the citizenry indifferent to the injustices involved.266 In contrast, if the
political branches were confined to imposing non-discriminatory
263 Detaining all terrorist suspects would overcome objections on equality grounds, but still
leave the policy vulnerable to challenges on liberty grounds. As Lord Hoffman emphasized,
“suspicion of being a supporter [of international terrorism] is one thing and proof of wrongdoing
is another.” Id. at 129-30. Indeed, the policy would be grossly overinclusive and hence
disproportionately restrictive of liberty if everyone who expressed sympathy for Al Qaeda in a
discussion overheard in a pub was subject to indefinite detention. Id.
264 This view was that of Lord Bingham of Cornhill. See id. at 102.
265 See supra Part III.
266 See Sunstein, supra note 66.
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restrictions on liberty, it would become much more likely that
significant portions of the citizenry would politically mobilize against
them if they seemed excessive or unfair.
Finally, in many cases involving tradeoffs between increased
security and decreased liberty in relation to the war on terror, cogent
and principled judicial balancing of resulting benefits and burdens may
be difficult to achieve. In A(FC), however, because the means chosen
to increase security were so disproportionate, and because the political
branches’ conclusion that the life of the nation was in peril was so
tenuous,267 the situation was quite different. Indeed, it seemed beyond
reasonable dispute that the increases in security likely to be achieved by
detention of non-deportable foreign terrorism suspects were far
outweighed by the burdens imposed on fundamental ECHR rights,
which apply to foreigners and nationals alike.268 In sum, this
demonstrates that, in some cases at least, straightforward judicial
balancing of liberty and security is both feasible and desirable.
V. ASSESSING AMERICAN BALANCING AND BRITISH AND ISRAELI
PROPORTIONALITY AS JUDICIAL TOOLS IN THE WAR ON TERROR
As seen thus far, American balancing appears too narrow as the
Court’s Hamdi plurality’s repudiation of executive unilateralism did not
result in an adequate protection of liberty.269 By the same token, Israeli
balancing seems too broad, for although in form it professes to leave a
zone of exclusivity to the executive,270 in practice virtually no military
action or policy remains beyond the reach of judicial balancing.271
Finally, it is difficult to gauge the scope of British balancing, given the
blatant disproportionality of the means used to implement the
derogation.272 Moreover, the full import of the contrast between the
respective positions of the three courts cannot be grasped without
reference to certain contextual factors that had an important bearing on
how each of them dealt with the cases before it.
An important difference between the three jurisdictions relates to
how they respectively chose to place issues arising out of the war on
267 See A(FC), 2 A.C. at 98-99 (referring to United Kingdom ministerial statements in 2001
and 2002 indicating a lack of intelligence concerning any immediate terrorist threat against the
United Kingdom).
268 Id. at 113-14.
269 See supra Part II.
270 The IDF is an administrative body, but it is under the command of the Prime Minister and
Minister of Defense. Beit Sourik, supra note 1, para. 23.
271 See supra Part III.
272 See supra Part IV.
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terror within one of the three legal paradigms identified above.273 The
justices in Hamdi were divided into four different legal positions
ranging from the paradigm of war to that of criminal law. The position
of the four justices in the plurality is best viewed as almost fitting
completely within the paradigm of the law of (conventional) war.
Indeed, the plurality agreed to the legitimacy of the detention of enemy
combatants for security reasons for the duration of the hostilities. Its
only concession to the unconventional nature of the war on terror was
that it recognized that, given the unusual nature of the enemy and the
extraordinary difficulty in pinpointing the end of such a war, risks of
mistaken detention and of the detentions remaining unnoticed were
much greater than in the context of ordinary war. Accordingly, the
plurality concluded, detainees ought to have a right to challenge their
status. But because the plurality was essentially working from a
paradigm of war, it granted procedural due process rights adequate in
the context of alleged deprivations of liberty or property in the realm of
civil, not criminal law. For anyone who regards Hamdi’s two-year
detention, which could have plausibly extended for decades, as better
fitting within a criminal law paradigm, however, the procedural rights
carved out by the plurality are bound to seem inadequate and
disproportionate.
The plurality in Hamdi operated from within a slightly modified
war paradigm, but only five of the nine justices consistently approached
all three American cases from the standpoint of a war paradigm. The
fifth justice in this group, Justice Thomas, actually dealt with these
cases strictly from the standpoint of the paradigm of (conventional) war,
deferring to the President as if Hamdi, Padilla, and the foreign citizens
from friendly nations detained in Guantanamo were no different than a
group of German prisoners of war captured in the course of active
combat against American troops in the North African or European
theaters of war during World War II.274
The four remaining justices in Hamdi did not find the procedural
rights endorsed by the plurality to be sufficient. Two of these, Justices
Scalia and Stevens, approached the case squarely from the standpoint of
the criminal law paradigm275 and would have ordered Hamdi released

273
274

See supra Part I.B.
Justice Thomas dissented in Hamdi because he would not have granted Hamdi the
procedural rights that the plurality opined he was entitled to. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S.
507, 579-81 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
275 These justices were prepared to allow for a limited period within which the Government
could sort out the status of detainees such as Hamdi. See id. at 554 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Beyond that period—and two years was well beyond—the Government would either have to
press criminal charges or release the detainees. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
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absent the Government filing criminal charges against him.276 Justices
Souter and Ginsburg would also have had Hamdi released, although not
strictly coming from a criminal law paradigm. Because they found
Hamdi’s detention wanting due to failings under the process-based
institutional approach277 and under pertinent international law standards
applicable to prisoners of war,278 they stood at least for the negative
proposition that Hamdi’s detention—whether or not he satisfied the
Government’s definition of “enemy combatant”—could not be fit
within the war paradigm. What these two justices left open, however, is
whether, had the institutional process-based requirements been met,
they would have still insisted on compliance with the procedural rights
called for in criminal cases.
Unlike the American Court, which seems clearly caught between
two paradigms, the Israeli Court perceives itself as firmly grounded in a
war paradigm, and a very conventional one for that matter. The Israeli
Court was quite explicit that it was applying the law of war and of
belligerent occupation.279 What is surprising under these circumstances
is how little deference the Israeli Court has actually given to the
military.280 Moreover, although the Court specified that the challenged
military actions involved in the cases discussed above were directed
against Palestinian terrorism,281 nothing specific to the war on terror
seems to figure in either the paradigm explicitly embraced by the Court
or in its actual decisions.
There is an incongruity between the Israeli Court’s unanimous
embrace of the war paradigm and its seeming under-weighing of the
military security objectives at stake in its cases. Whereas these cases
concern the rights and interests of Palestinian civilians, the Court also
stressed that, both in the West Bank and Gaza, terrorists often mingle
with the civilian population, thus posing a constant hidden and
unpredictable danger.282
Under these circumstances, the underweighing of, or lack of sufficient deference to, military security
objectives is puzzling unless one hypothesizes that alongside or
underneath the war paradigm lies a different paradigm.
This second paradigm is the police power law paradigm. The
occupying Israeli military administration is indeed the guarantor of
276
277
278
279
280
281
282

See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 554 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 549-50 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
See supra Part III.
See supra Part III.
See supra note 233 and accompanying text. The very purpose of the separation barrier was
to contain terrorism by separating the Palestinian population in the midst of which terrorists were
easily concealed from the Israeli population that they targeted. Id.
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public order and rights in those portions of the occupied territories that
it controls or substantially affects. From the standpoint of this second
paradigm, moreover, the IDF is exercising what amounts to police
powers vis-à-vis the Palestinian civilians affected by its activities in the
West Bank and Gaza. Just as any state bears responsibility for
maintaining order and providing essential services to its citizenry, the
IDF as military occupier had similar obligations toward Palestinian
civilians over whose lives it exercised substantial control. This police
power obligation of the IDF is most clearly manifest with respect to the
situation in Gaza that gave rise to the Physicians for Human Rights
case. Indeed, as emphasized by the Court in that case, the IDF had a
positive obligation toward the Palestinian civilians that included
providing or guaranteeing essential services, such as food, water, and
electricity.283 On the other hand, with respect to the Palestinian
civilians directly affected by the separation barrier in the West Bank,
the IDF had at least a negative obligation not to disrupt the public order
or public services more than absolutely necessary.284
Viewed from the standpoint of the police power law paradigm,
most of the claims of the Palestinian civilians in the above cases285
ought to have been treated by the Israeli Court as requiring a balancing
between what are essentially IDF police power claims286 and what
substantially amount to Palestinian civilians’ constitutional rights
claims. Consistent with this requirement of balancing, the Israeli Court
would be in the same position as any court confronting constitutional
cases presenting a conflict between the exercise of state police powers
and the vindication of fundamental individual rights.
In the end, the seeming incongruity of the Israeli decisions can be
traced back to the Court’s concurrent reliance on two separate
paradigms. From the standpoint of Israel’s interests and Israeli
administrative law, the Court was operating under a war paradigm, and,
hence, its deferential declarations regarding discretion in the pursuit of
military objectives.287 From the standpoint of the international law of
belligerent occupation and of its institutional role as guarantor of the
Palestinian population’s fundamental rights as recognized under
283
284
285

See Physicians For Human Rights, supra note 1, paras. 11-20.
See discussion of Beit Sourik case supra Part III.
The claims arising directly out of military combat, such as those pertaining to evacuation of
the wounded in the Physicians for Human Rights cases, supra note 1, paras. 21-23, do not fit
within the police power law paradigm.
286 In a democracy, police powers are used to foster collective goals that are majoritarian in
origin. In an occupation, in contrast, the collective goals involved are not majoritarian, but
instead imposed by international law. Nevertheless, in terms of the content of these goals and of
their clashes with individual rights, the two situations are largely equivalent and hence the police
power law paradigm can extend to both.
287 See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
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applicable humanitarian standards, on the other hand, the Court placed
itself within a police power law paradigm. Moreover, effectively, given
the little deference it accorded to military discretion, the Court remained
principally within the police power law paradigm.
The Law Lords in A(FC), much like the American Court, seem to
straddle between the law of war paradigm and the criminal law
paradigm. Those Law Lords who agreed that the derogation from
ECHR rights was warranted because the life of the United Kingdom
was under threat would undoubtedly have agreed to indefinite detention
of suspected terrorists were it not for the discriminatory manner in
which it was being implemented. On the other hand, as noted above,
the detainees could challenge their deprivations of liberty before
administrative bodies and courts, though, unlike criminal suspects, they
were not entitled to disclosure of information used by the government to
brand them as suspected terrorists.288
Unlike in the American cases where the war paradigm may have
been misused, but where there was an actual foreign war being fought in
Afghanistan, in the United Kingdom the war paradigm appeared to have
emerged out of context. The suspected terrorists detained in the United
Kingdom had no known connection to any conventional war; only a
supposed connection to a loose and ill-defined network of terrorists.
Moreover, the war paradigm, as we have seen, is usually only
appropriate in times of crisis.289 In contrast, the whole question of the
legitimacy of derogation, which figures prominently in A(FC), puts into
question whether the United Kingdom’s war on terror is being fought
under conditions of crisis. Assuming, consistent with some views
among the Law Lords, that it is not being fought under such conditions,
is the war paradigm still appropriate? As will be argued below,290 so
long as the war on terror is fought under conditions of stress rather than
of crisis, neither the war paradigm nor the criminal law one is likely to
be adequate.
The task of determining whether, and to what extent, judicial
balancing is appropriate in the context of the war on terror is certainly
complicated by the comparative insights gleaned thus far. What ought
to be balanced, and what weight to ascribe to the particular interests to
be balanced, depends in part on whether one embraces a war, criminal
law, or police power law paradigm. It also depends in part on whether
one deems that the war on terror creates conditions of crisis or
conditions of stress or even (less likely though not impossibly) ordinary
conditions.
288
289
290

See supra note 244 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.B.
See infra Part V.
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The first question that consideration of balancing in relation to the
war on terror poses is whether it would be optimal to rely exclusively on
extra-judicial balancing. The advantage of doing so is that it allows for
bodies with greater expertise and political accountability to weigh
competing interests rather than relying on courts to do so. In cases of
extra-judicial balancing, such as those that arise under the constitutional
guarantees afforded criminal defendants under the American
Constitution, courts are limited to categorical determinations.
Arguably, categorical adjudication is preferable to judicial balancing,
because it presumably allows for less judicial discretion or judicial
politics.291
In spite of the possible benefits of extra-judicial balancing or of
those of categorical judicial determinations, the preceding analysis
clearly counsels against doing away with judicial balancing. For the
reasons already alluded to in the analysis of the Hamdi case,292
executive balancing is likely to be skewed owing to that branch’s
special responsibility for security.293 Furthermore, the institutional
process-based approach requiring both executive and legislative action
provides greater safeguards than the executive branch’s acting alone.
As evinced by the U.S. Congress’s broad delegation of power after
9/11, by the sweeping powers it granted the Executive by enacting the
USA PATRIOT Act,294 and by the equally sweeping British legislation,
however, the latter approach and the additional balancing it promotes do
not do away with the need for judicial protection of constitutional rights
or their equivalents.295
291 This is, in fact, a debatable point. Certain adjudications seem to bear this point out, but not
others. For example, a law that provides that no vehicles are allowed in public parks certainly
makes for a categorical determination that motorcycles are excluded from parks. But what about
motorized wheelchairs? See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 125 (1961). A judge may take
up that issue categorically, but it may be more fruitful if she were to appeal to balancing.
Assuming the purpose of the law is quiet enjoyment of the parks by the municipality’s residents,
is it not better to decide the issue raised by motorized wheelchairs through a balancing process,
comparing the cost of excluding disabled persons who could not otherwise use the park against
the benefit of not having the extra noise or movement that motorized wheelchairs would
inevitably produce? As this Article argues below, that limitation to categorical judicial action is
neither desirable nor properly feasible in the context of the war on terror. See infra text
accompany note 307. Thus, it is not necessary to pursue this subject any further.
292 See supra Part II.
293 The same argument applies, perhaps even more strongly, with respect to the administrative
power represented by the IDF in the Israeli cases.
294 See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115
Stat. 272 (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
295 As parliamentary democracies, rather than presidential ones like the United States, Israel
and the United Kingdom have less of a separation between legislative and executive power than
does the United States. Since this Article argues than even the arguably stronger separation
prevalent in the United States does not suffice to adequately protect rights in the war on terror,
separation of powers differences between the three countries can be left aside for present
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To better appreciate this last point, it may be useful to look at the
alternative offered by a categorical approach such as that found in
Justice Scalia’s opinion in Hamdi. That approach would not have been
appropriate for the Israeli cases dealing with substantive rights of
civilians. Indeed, a categorical approach to substantive rights provides
too blunt a tool to allow for as much enjoyment of such rights as
compatible with the state’s realization of its vital security needs.
Furthermore, even under the assumption that a categorical approach is
unequivocally superior with respect to the procedural rights of criminal
defendants, Justice Scalia’s approach seems too rigid in the context of
the war on terror. Because Hamdi’s plight was similar to that of a
criminal suspect, and because the plurality in Hamdi gave too much
weight to the government’s security interests,296 a categorical approach
may seem to have been superior in the context of that case. But the
numerous other kinds of situations in which liberty and security are
bound to clash in the war on terror will inevitably be varied and
different. Accordingly, the more flexible balancing approach would be
better. For example, even under the circumstances surrounding
Padilla’s detention, and assuming that after two years of detention
proper judicial balancing would grant him essentially the same rights as
those of a criminal defendant, there may still be a need for flexibility.
Thus, if the Government arrested Padilla on the basis of intelligence it
could not reveal, it might be appropriate to allow it to introduce hearsay
testimony or present secret evidence in camera allowing for review and
challenge by the judge but not by the detainee’s counsel.
Balancing affords greater flexibility, but is it reliable? Can it be
made to conform to standards? Or, does balancing in the end rest solely
on the unfettered discretion of judges? To circumscribe this question
more narrowly, assuming that balancing can work satisfactorily in areas
other than the war on terror,297 are there special problems or issues
pertaining to that latter area?

purposes.
296 See supra p. 2120.
297 This assumption is, of course, highly debatable given the many problems identified with
respect to balancing. See Aleinikoff, supra note 41. Even under the best circumstances, using
judicial balancing is unlikely to lead to a single right result for every case. However, although the
result produced by means of balancing may be indeterminate for any complex or controversial
issue, so too can be the result reached through a categorical or any other interpretive approach.
For a theoretical discussion of the problems of indeterminacy in legal interpretation, see MICHEL
ROSENFELD, JUST INTERPRETATIONS: LAW BETWEEN ETHICS AND POLITICS, at ch. 1 (1998). For
present purposes, suffice it to note that the balancing approach in the United States, such as
review of racial classifications under a strict scrutiny test, see supra note 49, and the
proportionality test used in many constitutional democracies elsewhere, can lead to fairly
consistent, reasonable and fair results. It is this potential of balancing under ordinary
circumstances that will serve here as a baseline.
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In all genuine war-on-terror conflicts between security and
fundamental rights, both the government objectives involved and the
rights at stake are bound to be of great importance. Consistent with this
fact, the respect in which these terms ought to be weighed against one
another can be satisfied by application of the derogation standards of
Article 15 of the ECHR in force in the United Kingdom, the American
strict scrutiny test, the Israeli tripartite proportionality test, or something
equivalent.
The weighing operation itself differs according to whether one
operates under the United Kingdom standard, the American strict
scrutiny test, or the Israeli proportionality test. Under the ECHR Article
15 standard in force in the United Kingdom, and under American strict
scrutiny, once the relevant government objective is judicially or
otherwise decreed as being sufficiently weighty—i.e., as meeting a
threat to the life of the nation in the United Kingdom, or as being
“compelling” in the United States—that objective is not subjected to
any further balancing or scrutiny. The focus then shifts to the
governmental means deployed to achieve the objective in question and
the “weighing” is confined to such means.298 For example, assume
Hamdi had claimed that it violated his substantive liberty rights to be
detained as an enemy combatant, rather than challenging his designation
as such. In that case, if the Government’s claims that neutralizing those
fighting the United States on the side of the terrorists and preventing
them from rejoining the enemy before the end of hostilities were
deemed compelling, then the designation of enemy combatants and
preventing them from returning to battle would no longer be open for
discussion or further balancing. What would remain under the strict
scrutiny test would be determining whether means less drastic than
imprisonment—e.g., wearing an electronic device allowing constant
Government monitoring—would be equally likely to lead to satisfaction
of the desired government objective.299
The third subtest of the Israeli proportionality test, on the other
hand, does provide for further discussion and balancing of government

298 Formally as we have seen, the question is one of “fit” between means and ends. See supra
Part I.C. Substantively, however, “fit” means that pursuit of a compelling state interest only
outweighs a conflicting right in so far as the injury to that right caused by such pursuit is no
greater than absolutely necessary.
299 Compare Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), where the court applied strict
scrutiny and found internment of Japanese-Americans in detention camps during World War II
constitutional as it accepted the claim of the American military that the danger of a Japanese
invasion of the U.S. West Coast would be greatly enhanced by availability of a potential fifth
column living throughout the West Coast. That claim, though eventually proven false, see
Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406 (N.D. Cal. 1984), remained unquestioned by the
Korematsu majority in 1944.
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objectives that seem “compelling” by American standards.300 Thus, in
Beit Sourik, the Israeli Court accepted the “compelling” need for a
separation barrier to stem the flow of terrorist attacks against Israeli
civilians.301
Yet, in applying the third subtest of the Israeli
proportionality test, the Court compared the particular separation barrier
pursued by the IDF in the good faith belief that it would maximize
security to a proposed alternative that may have led to somewhat
lessened security but would have significantly reduced the injuries to
the rights and interests of affected Palestinian civilians. And on the
basis of that comparison, the Court held the IDF barrier to be
disproportionate.302 In short, unlike in the United Kingdom and the
United States, where state objectives are weighed against an objective
standard, in Israel, similar state objectives are weighed against one
another to determine which among them is most proportionate.303
The Israeli proportionality test makes for significantly more
intrusive judicial intervention into policy, including military policy,
than does the American strict scrutiny test or the British proportionality
standard.304 This difference is important and it must be kept in mind
while considering whether balancing is appropriate or desirable in cases
involving military affairs. More specifically, the question that needs to
be addressed in relation to this latter difference between the American
and the Israeli approach—which may be conveniently referred to as a
difference between “balancing means” and “balancing ends”—is
whether the Israeli approach goes too far, and if it does, whether that is
due to lack of judicial expertise in weighing military policy or to the
conclusion that such weighing is impolitic and potentially damaging to
the judiciary’s institutional interests.

300 Whereas the Israeli proportionality test differs from the American strict scrutiny test, in
both countries protecting the citizenry in the face of terror is among the weightiest government
objectives. See discussion supra Part I.D.
301 See supra note 70.
302 See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
303 Since the nexus between means and ends is a relational one, the IDF barrier and the
Council proposed barrier in Beit Sourik may be regarded as means to the more abstract end of the
country’s security in general rather than as ends in themselves as two contending concrete
embodiments of a particular type of security. Ultimately, the level of abstraction at which a given
government objective should be set ought to be determined by practical considerations. For
present purposes, suffice it to note that even if the separation barrier is taken as the means, and
the country’s security in general as the end, there would still be some balancing with respect to
ends. This follows from the proportionality test’s third subtest, which leads to the conclusion that
a somewhat less secure but significantly less injurious barrier than the IDF’s would be more
proportionate.
304 If the British standard is interpreted as requiring judicial review of a political determination
that the nation is in a state of crisis, it would more closely approximate the Israeli standard than
the American.
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There are strong arguments against courts weighing ends in such a
way that squarely thrusts them into policy-making—a power
constitutions generally grant to legislative and administrative bodies.305
Assuming, nonetheless, that such balancing is institutionalized in a
particular country, is there any reason to single out military policy for
exemption from judicial balancing?
In terms of lack of judicial expertise, military policy seems no
different than environmental, economic, or police policy aimed to
securing public order. Moreover, whether or not balancing of ends is
considered appropriate, it is difficult to see how courts could avoid
balancing means in the context of military affairs. For example,
suppose that once the separation barrier is completed it were to cut off
two West Bank villages from one another but would allow for passage
through doors from one village to the other. Suppose further that the
IDF refuses all passage to Palestinians for reasons of military security.
In a putative suit by Palestinians who live in one of the villages and
want to visit relatives in the other, any court using a standard akin to the
American strict scrutiny test would have to determine if the total ban is
necessary in order to accomplish the IDF’s military security objectives.
And such determination would require a factual inquiry into whether
any easing of the IDF’s total ban on passage would be possible without
reducing the level of security provided by the total ban.
The relevant difference between military policy and other policies
such as environmental policy, for example, is that the former requires
much more secrecy than the latter, and that military issues may have a
different kind of political sensitivity than environmental or most other
non-military issues. Indeed, military affairs tend to have foreign as well
as domestic implications, and a serious impact on national security and
diplomacy.
From the standpoint of inter-institutional balancing, therefore, it is
preferable to avoid or greatly limit judicial balancing of ends in general,
and especially in the realm of military policy. Moreover, although
balancing of means generally is crucial from an inter-institutional
standpoint,306 certain precautionary limitations with little substantial
effect on affected fundamental rights should be permissible in the
context of military affairs. For example, greater tolerance of hearsay
evidence, or recourse to in camera review to preserve confidentiality of

305 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. arts. I (Legislative powers granted to Congress) and II (Executive
powers delegated to President); 1958 French Constitution, art. 34 (Parliament makes laws);
German Basic Law, arts. 70-78 (Parliament and Government make federal law).
306 See discussion supra p. 2112 (indicating that a purely process-based institutional approach
would insufficiently protect fundamental rights).
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sensitive military information, ought to be allowed even if that would
slightly weaken actual protection of fundamental rights.
In the last analysis, there ought to be no automatic ban on judicial
balancing of ends. In some cases, as the discussion of the A(FC)
indicated, judicial balancing of ends may be both clearly feasible and
desirable.307 Even in the military context, there may be rare cases where
no other institutional balancing of security and rights takes place at all
and where, accordingly, fundamental rights would be left completely
unprotected absent judicial balancing. In the remaining cases, however,
judicial balancing of ends should be avoided and balancing of means
pursued with appropriate adjustments to avoid compromising military
security.

VI. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS: BALANCING AND TERROR
Though judicial balancing should not be eliminated in cases arising
from the war on terror, its shortcomings, which have emerged in the
course of the preceding analysis, call for a determination of whether it is
possible to structure and guide such balancing so as to minimize
unsatisfactory outcomes. Should that be impossible, use of judicial
balancing would still be preferable to its abandonment, but its benefits
would remain modest and unpredictable.
To explore how judicial balancing may be optimized, it is useful to
start from the six cases examined above, to postulate what would have
been the most desirable outcome for each of them and to determine
what institutional mechanisms, contextual references, and judicial
techniques would have been instrumental in stirring the process toward
the desired outcome. The desirable outcome in Hamdi and Padilla
seems obvious and has been mentioned extensively in the preceding
discussion: both Hamdi and Padilla should have been granted the rights
that are substantively equivalent to the due process rights accorded
criminal defendants, with flexibility concerning the means of
effectuating such rights to accommodate military and intelligence
concerns relating to the war on terror.308 With respect to particulars, the
circumstances surrounding Hamdi’s detention are different from those
pertaining to Padilla. The Government’s case against Hamdi seemed
weak (otherwise, he could have been prosecuted like Lindh)309 and his
307
308
309

See supra Part IV.
See supra Part II.
See supra note 160.
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release would and did pose little danger.310 With respect to Padilla, on
the other hand, it is not clear whether the Government never had
sufficient evidence to prosecute him, had sufficient evidence but could
not prosecute him without revealing sensitive intelligence, or whether,
as it now appears, it had a weak case against him much like it did
against Hamdi. This could be clarified in a hearing in which the
Government would have the burden of proof, but where sensitive
information could be, if necessary, only disclosed to the judge, without
giving access to it to Padilla or his counsel. This latter possibility
amounts to a departure in substance, and not only form, from the due
process rights of criminal defendants. This departure would be
proportionate, however, as it would strike a balance between the
Government’s security needs and Padilla’s liberty interests. Involving
the judge in the determination of the relevant contested issues would
secure the institutional benefit of a judicial decision though without the
usual added protections of the adversarial process, which makes for
confrontation by the detainee’s counsel.311 Moreover, the difference in
treatment between Padilla and Hamdi advanced here is also justified in
relation to the gravity of the respective threats that these two individuals
were accused of posing against the United States. Hamdi was, at worst,
yet one more soldier in a ground war in Afghanistan; Padilla, in
contrast, was once alleged to be a terrorist plotting a devastating attack
that could claim hundreds of thousands of lives and destroy the world’s
most important financial center.312
Because Rasul, like Padilla, was disposed of on threshold grounds,
the fate of the Guantanamo detainees was not examined in any detail by
the U.S. Supreme Court. Since the Court’s decision, some Guantanamo
detainees have been charged, and trials before military commissions
have started;313 some detainees have been released;314 and some
310 It is noteworthy in this respect that shortly after the Supreme Court decision, the
Government began negotiating for Hamdi’s release rather than undertaking further litigation. See
Philip Shenon, U.S. Signals End to Legal Fight Over an ‘Enemy Combatant’, N.Y TIMES, Aug.
13, 2004, at A10. Shortly thereafter, Hamdi was returned to Saudi Arabia. See supra note 160.
311 If this is indeed the most proportionate outcome under the relevant circumstances, it
illustrates why Justice Scalia’s categorical approach expressed in Hamdi is too blunt a tool in the
war on terror.
312 Imagining the devastation caused by a dirty bomb is an unspeakable horror. A proper
judicial assessment in a case such as Padilla’s would have to gauge the probability of such a
bomb being successfully detonated in a city like New York or Chicago. If that probability turned
out to be infinitesimally small, a judge should not skew balancing due to virtually purely
imaginary horrors. See infra notes 333-334 and accompanying text for further discussion of the
role of imagination in the war on terror.
313 See Sebastiaan Gottlieb, First Trial Starts at Guantanamo, Aug. 24, 2004, RENSE.COM,
http://rense.com/general56/fufut.htm.
314 See, e.g., Gitmo Detainees Return to France, CNN.COM, July 27, 2004,
http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/europe/07/27/france.gitmo/index.html.
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detainees were ruled enemy combatants in a review process organized
by the Pentagon in response to the Court’s decision.315 A suit
challenging the above mentioned military commissions is now pending
before the Court.316 In terms of an optimal result, the Guantanamo
detainees should be granted procedural rights within the spectrum lying
between the rights recommended for Hamdi and those recommended for
Padilla.
Beyond these procedural rights, all three cases raise important
substantive rights issues that for the most part were not addressed by the
Court. The plurality in Hamdi did hold that the Executive Branch may
detain enemy combatants until the end of hostilities, thus treating them
like prisoners of war under the Geneva Conventions.317 This holding,
however, which has the support of a bare majority of the justices,318
raises more questions than it answers. Leaving aside relevant issues of
international law that are beyond the scope of this Article, while the
Hamdi plurality’s conception of an “enemy combatant” is roughly
equivalent to the conception of a “prisoner of war” under the Geneva
Conventions, the Pentagon has taken the position that enemy
combatants may be held indefinitely without charges.319
315
316

See Detainees Ruled Enemy Combatants, WASH. POST, Aug. 14, 2004, at A09.
See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S.Ct. 622 (2005) (mem.) (granting certiorari on whether the
commissions are statutorily authorized by statute or by the President’s inherent powers and
whether petitioner may judicially enforce his rights under the Geneva Conventions via habeas
corpus petition). A panel for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit had held in July 2005
that the commissions were authorized by Congress’s Authorization for Use of Military Force, that
the Geneva Conventions conferred no private enforcement right of action, and that,
notwithstanding, the commissions did not violate any rights under the Geneva Conventions.
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005). In December 2005, Congress passed the
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, which vests exclusive authority to hear habeas appeals from
Guantanamo detainees in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit and the Supreme Court.
28 U.S.C.S. § 2241(e) (LexisNexis 2005). The Bush Administration has since moved to dismiss
detainee challenges already filed before passage of that act, including Hamdan’s, for want of
subject-matter jurisdiction. See Dan Eggen & Josh White, U.S. Seeks to Avoid Detainee Ruling,
WASH. POST, Jan. 13, 2006, at A07. In a press release, Senator Carl Levin, one of the co-authors
of the legislation, has disputed the administration’s attempts to apply it retroactively to pending
cases. Press Release, Sen. Carl Levin, Levin Statement on Administration Announcement it Will
Seek
Dismissal
of
Guantanamo
Lawsuits
(Jan.
4,
2006),
available
at
http://www.senate.gov/~levin/newsroom/release.cfm?id=250235
(“‘Congress
specifically
considered and rejected language that would have applied the Graham-Levin amendment
retroactively to pending cases.’”)
317 See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 118, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (“Prisoners of war shall be released and repatriated without
delay after the cessation of active hostilities.”).
318 The fifth justice in support is Justice Thomas, who endorsed the Administration’s position
on the subject. See supra note 106.
319 See Detainees Ruled Enemy Combatants, supra note 315. Faced by challenges from
human rights organizations, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld announced in 2004 that the case of
every detainee in Guantanamo will be reviewed once a year to determine if he is a security threat
to the United States. See id.
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Ideally, the category of “enemy combatant” ought to be eliminated
or greatly limited in scope. This category fits well within the paradigm
of war so long as “enemy combatant” is roughly synonymous with
“prisoner of war.” But the war on terror, as we have seen and will
discuss further below,320 cannot be encapsulated within the war
paradigm. The war on terror is, at least in part, like the war on crime, a
constant struggle with varying degrees of intensity, but without any
final outcome. To the extent that the war on terror fits within the
criminal law paradigm, the potential lifelong detention of an enemy
combatant without the filing of any charges, let alone conviction of a
crime, seems grossly disproportionate and easily prone to abuse. For
that reason, for some of those detained as enemy combatants, such as
Padilla, who have not been detained at or near a theater of war, the label
of enemy combatant ought to be dropped altogether. Because the war
on terror is not merely a part of the war on crime, someone like Padilla
should be subject to detention without charges for a reasonably brief
period, to allow the Government to interrogate him and to neutralize
him while it tries to round up confederates, dismantle cells or
successfully thwart an ongoing terrorist operation. After this initial
period, the detainee should be criminally charged or released.321
For someone like Hamdi or many of the Guatanamo prisoners who
were detained at or near a theater of war, on the other hand, the status of
enemy combatant may be adequate so long as it remains coextensive
with that of prisoners of war. Also, to prevent abuses based on the
linkage of a war that had the trappings of a conventional war, such as
the war in Afghanistan with war on terror, any detainee labeled an
enemy combatant should be either released or charged with a crime
upon cessation of the hostilities conducted in the manner of a
conventional war.
Turning to the Israeli cases, it seems clear that their principal
shortcoming was the Court’s failure to give adequate weight to military
security determinations.322 It is difficult, however, to ascertain what
would have been the optimal result in these cases. In Beit Sourik, if the
security differences between the IDF’s separation fence and that of the
Council were indeed “minute” as the Court found, then the actual result
may come close to the optimal one. What remains problematic then, is
the way the Court reached that result. Although the Court professed to
give deference to military expertise, it in substance engaged in de novo
320
321

See infra pp. 2153-56.
As terrorism is likely to take unanticipated forms, judges should be empowered to extend
the initial period of detention without charges upon the government proving it has a compelling
need for such extension.
322 See supra Part III.
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balancing.323 The question this raises, therefore, is whether the Court
could have reached the same result by relying on better judicial means.
In Physicians for Human Rights it is also difficult to assess what
would have been the optimal result. It may have also been the one
reached by the Court, though if that led to a significant increase in
deaths and injuries among Israeli soldiers, then it would be an
undesirable result. Indeed, balancing security and liberty in military
operations involving issues of life and death should be left to the
military so long as it undertakes its responsibilities legally, competently,
and in good faith.324 Moreover, as the Court itself noted, it was
reaching the “outer limits of the judiciary,”325 by intervening in day-today military operations as they were unfolding. One could argue that
the Court actually went beyond those limits as it acted more as a
mediator between the IDF and Palestinian civilians than as an
adjudicator. This raised the question of whether it is possible to find a
more suitable alternative that would preserve the benefits of oversight
over the military, where appropriate, without the judiciary’s unduly
trampling on military operations or becoming involved in day-to-day
decision-making.326
As already emphasized, the result reached by the Law Lords in
A(FC) is clearly the right one.327 Accordingly, it would be impossible
to improve on the actual outcome of the case. On the other hand, the
road to that outcome is confusing due to the possibility of invalidation
of the challenged detention scheme on two alternative grounds:
improper derogation or disproportionate means. This choice between
alternatives not only allowed for murky reasoning regarding whether the
United Kingdom was in a state of crisis, but also permitted obscuring
the important issue of whether the judiciary should defer to the political
branches in the determination of whether a state of crisis exists.328
Optimally, derogation decisions should be judicially reviewable in
terms of the distinction between a state of crisis and conditions of stress.
As we have seen, in relation to A(FC), criteria for such review existed,
and even factoring in a presumption of validity for a political branch
decision to derogate, the British war on terror did not create crisis
323
324

See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
The Court did state that it deferred to the military so long as soldiers’ lives were in danger.
See supra note 229 and accompanying text. In view of the ongoing terrorist threat with terrorists
hiding within civilian crowds, see supra note 233 and accompanying text, it is arguable that it is
impossible to separate parts of the Gaza military operation involved that pose risks to soldiers’
lives from other parts that do not.
325 See supra note 216.
326 One possibility would be to entrust this mediator responsibility to a non-judiciary body
supervised by the courts.
327 See supra Part IV.
328 See supra note 249 and accompanying text.
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conditions.329 It did create conditions of stress, which though not
warranting wholesale derogation from fundamental rights, may
nonetheless justify discrete limitations on particular rights that may be
somewhat more extensive than those found permissible in ordinary
times.
All the problems discussed thus far arise in substantial part because
the legal issues that emerge from the war on terror do not fit neatly
within any of the three existing legal paradigms discussed throughout.
Moreover, all the suggested optimal results presented above involve
some shift in paradigm. Consistent with this, it seems appropriate to
adopt a new paradigm, the “war-on-terror law paradigm.” This new
paradigm incorporates aspects of the three other paradigms but recasts
the relationships among them. The war-on-terror law paradigm also
accounts for the tensions that pit conditions of stress against conditions
of crisis.
The war-on-terror law paradigm is conceived as a dynamic one,
evolving and adapting to the needs and problems of the war on terror.
Its contours are defined by the contextual shifts produced by
contemporary terrorism and by the reactions mounted against it. The
war on terror is in many ways different from ordinary war. It is
different in terms of the enemy it confronts, of how it is fought, of the
dangers it poses, and of its duration. Whereas conventional wars are
generally limited in duration, the war on terror must be conceived as a
war without end.330 This, in turn, should have a strong bearing on how
extraordinary powers are conceived and institutionalized in the context
of the war on terror. In the context of a conventional war of limited
duration, emergency powers can be conceived and implemented as
temporary extraordinary measures. In the war on terror extraordinary
measures must be conceived as permanent, and as such require a
different and more careful balancing of security and rights—one that is
tailored to the concerns of times of stress rather than to the exigencies of
times of crisis. Had this difference been taken into account, it might
definitely have caused the result in Hamdi to come closer to the optimal
result described above.331
Various references have been made above to the important role
that imagination plays in shaping our conception of terrorism and of the
nature and likelihood of the threats it poses for society.332 It was also
noted that imagination plays a larger part in shaping American and
329
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See supra note 260 and accompanying text.
Whether, in fact, the war on terror will come to a clear end such as the two world wars did
is of course impossible to predict.
331 See supra pp. 2149-50.
332 See supra pp. 2103, 2138 and note 66 and accompanying text.
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British conceptions of terror than it does in shaping Israeli ones.333
Whereas it is important not to lack imagination sufficient to prompt
adequate preparation to defend and protect against terrorism,
exaggerated and unlimited imagination can lead to skewed balancing
and undue suppression of civil liberties.
By its very nature, terrorism is intended to cause fear, panic and
insecurity to a degree that is often disproportionate to the damage
inflicted or the real danger posed.334 To be sure, some of the imaginable
acts of terrorism, such as dirty bombs or biological or chemical
contamination, could cause mass disasters. Others, such as suicide
bombings or truck-bombing incidents, may cause only dozens of
casualties, certainly an unacceptable toll and nothing to be taken lightly,
but something much smaller than the casualties suffered in conventional
wars.335 It is important for the institutions of government, including the
judiciary, not to be swayed by the most frightening imaginary scenarios
without first inquiring into the feasibility or probability of particular
kinds of acts of terror.336 Otherwise, both inter-institutional and judicial
balancing will inevitably become skewed.
The Israeli cases underscore the importance of including elements
of the police power law paradigm in the war-on-terror law paradigm.
Whereas it is true that the Israeli situation is rather unique given its
occupation of Palestinian territory, to the extent that the problems raised
by the separation barrier and aspects of the military occupation in Gaza
can be genuinely regarded as “internal,” its implications are quite far
reaching. Indeed, the war on terror seems often bound to require
imposing restrictions and burdens on a country’s own citizens. And
often, as in the case of the Arab-American community in the United
States after 9/11, such burdens fall disproportionately on particular
minorities.337 It is accordingly important to remember that even in
333
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See supra p. 2103.
Even schemes involving dirty bombs, poisoning of water supplies, biological and chemical
warfare and other horrors frequently associated with terrorism would not cause any danger
comparable to mutual nuclear annihilation. See supra p. 2087. Yet because of the random,
arbitrary, and unpredictable quality of terrorism, it is prone to causing greater panic than the
constant nuclear threat did during the Cold War.
335 In the Yom Kippur War fought during seventeen days Israel suffered 2,523 casualties, see
Peter Colón, The Yom Kippur War: A Nation Caught By Surprise, The Friends of Israel Gospel
Ministry,
Inc.,
http://sites.silaspartners.com/partner/Article_Display_Page/0,,PTID306608
|CHID556136|CIID1397306,00.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2006), as compared to the nine hundred
it suffered from terrorism from 2000 to April 2004. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
336 See Chemical, Biological, Radiological And Nuclear (CBRN) Terrorism, The Wednesday
Report, http://www.thewednesdayreport.com/twr/CBRN.htm (last visited Mar. 6, 2006) (stating
that the “popular scenario involving poisoning the water supply of a major metropolitan area does
not appear very feasible” and that use of many chemical or biological agents would depend on a
perfect combination of various atmospheric conditions to be successful).
337 See, e.g., Muslims, Arabs Bracing for Discrimination, RELIGIONLINK.ORG, Feb. 24, 2003,
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countries like the United States and the United Kingdom, where recent
terrorism is not connected to a conventional war or boundary dispute,
the war on terror does not merely fall within the war and criminal law
paradigms.
Assuming that the results in the Israel cases are the optimal ones,
suggesting ways to circumvent the danger of judicial overreaching
seems particularly difficult. It is clear that judicial intrusions into
military policy and action, even if not absolutely barred, ought to be few
and far between. The Israeli Court’s intervention was seemingly
inevitable as it was prompted by the need to avoid leaving a legal
vacuum.338 Under different circumstances, however, it seems preferable
to curtail the scope of judicial balancing either through the
administrative process, if the military carries out the law-and-order
function, or through legislation, if civilian authorities do.
Some of the tasks enumerated above for purposes of closing the
gap between the actual court decisions and the suggested optimal
outcomes, such as clarification of the category of “enemy combatant,”
are better left to legislators. Other tasks can be entrusted to judicial
balancing as properly circumscribed within the emerging paradigm of
the war on terror. This will inevitably involve some experimentation
and some discretion to choose among various open paths. This does not
mean that judicial balancing in the area need be unconstrained or
undisciplined. Given a commonality of values and objectives when it
comes to the war on terror, and given that successful judicial balancing
requires openness toward all plausible positions,339 it is quite possible
that a cogent, fair, and balanced jurisprudence on the war of terror will
emerge. We are at the beginning of this process, and hopefully
development of the new legal paradigm of the war on terror will provide
useful tools to handle these novel, constantly changing, and always
daunting challenges.

http://www.Religionlink.org/tip-030224a.php.
338 Indeed, absent intervention by Israeli courts, aggrieved Palestinian civilians would, as a
practical matter, have no legal recourse for violations of their humanitarian rights.
339 Cf Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term: Foreword: Traces of SelfGovernment, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4, 34 (1976) (“Adoption of the balancing standard . . . commits
[judges] to the [Supreme] Court’s and the country’s project of resolving normative disputes by
conversation . . . .”).

